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When Does Legal Flexibility Work in
Environmental Law?
Eric Biber * & Josh Eagle**
Environmental law scholars, practitioners, and policymakers have
wrestled for some time with the implications of climate change for
environmental aw. There is widespread, although not universal, agreement
that climate change requires greater flexibility in environmental legal systems.
Flexibility-reduced procedural requirements for administrative agency
decision making and less rigid substantive standards-would allow the
agencies that implement environmental law to adapt to a future world
characterized by dynamic, uncertain changes in natural resource systems.
According to its proponents, flexibility would make it easier for agencies to
more frequently update their management or regulatory decisions to respond to
changed conditions, and also to facilitate adaptive management. However,
there has been little exploration of the conditions under which flexibility
improves or undermines the eftectiveness of environmental law.
This Article examines two areas of environmental law that have
historically had a great deal of flexibility: hunting law and marine fisheries
law. In both areas, management and regulatory decisions are updated on a
regular basis by the relevant agencies, often annually. Procedural
requirements for making decisions are often streamlined. And the substantive
standards that apply to agency decisions are often quite broad and flexible,
leaving substantial discretion to the agency. Yet these two areas of
environmental aw have experienced very different outcomes in terms of
implementation: fisheries management in the United States is often perceived
as failing, while hunting law is seen as quite successful in achieving its goals.
This Article concludes that these different outcomes are the result of the
interaction of legal flexibility with two other factors: the level of uncertainty
about the condition or status of the natural resource being managed and the
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political context for regulatory or management decisions. Fisheries
management is characterized by much greater levels of uncertainty about
population levels than hunting management. Moreover, fisheries are the one
area in the U.S. economy where there is still a substantial commercial industry
based on the capture of wildlife for human use. The combination of scientific
uncertainty and flexible law creates a substantial discretionary space in which
decision makers can operate. In other words, decision makers have a wide
range of legally defensible management choices. The fishing industry is able to
exploit this fact to argue for weaker, but still legally defensible, regulation. The
industry has every incentive to organize in pursuit of this goal. In contrast,
commercial hunting was eliminated in the United States in the nineteenth
century. Thus, there are no major interest groups with a stake in increasing
hunting quotas, and therefore there is no substantial effort to manipulate a
flexible legal system to weaken regulatory standards. Whether flexibility will be
successful in a regulatory or management system will depend in part on the
scientific and political context for the resource being protected or managed
Flexibility is not a panacea that can be applied uniformly throughout
environmental law.
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LEGAL FLEXIBILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long debated the merits of incorporating flexibility into
environmental laws.' Flexibility puts decisions in the hands of agencies,
which- compared to legislatures-have more time and the expertise to study
proposed means and targets, to put proposals out for public comment, and to
monitor the results after rules have been adopted. On the other hand,
inflexibility-mandating or strictly constraining agency choice in the language
of a statute-might save time and resources for the agency and, more
important, can prevent rules from being delayed or watered down by pressure
applied by regulated industries during the agency rulemaking processes.
Climate change has revitalized the debate, while at the same time
narrowing the divide between proponents of flexibility and inflexibility.
Climate change will almost certainly bring about environmental conditions
beyond what existing regulatory systems have previously encountered. Due to
the difficulty in predicting the effects of climate change on natural resources
and the environment, many if not most scholars believe that addressing climate
change requires a more flexible version of environmental law. The majority
view appears to be that environmental laws ought to be changed so that
agencies have more freedom to respond to unpredictable developments such as
new migratory patterns, unforeseeable alterations of terrestrial and marine
habitats, sea level rise, and changes in precipitation and runoff patterns among
others. The logic is straightforward: climate change will lead to previously
unseen rates and directions of change; increased uncertainty will decrease the
value of past data in modeling the future; thus our inability to see over the
horizon makes it imperative that we amend environmental law so as to permit
decision makers to be more agile and responsive.2 Some scholars, aware of the
potential downsides of flexibility, have attempted to circumscribe the
prescribed new, enhanced flexibility by using terms such as "principled
I. With the caveat that "flexibility" has taken on many meanings in the context of this particular
debate (a topic we discuss later in this Article), examples of works highlighting the advantages of
flexibility include BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAIJDIRTY AIR (1981);
Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform,
92 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979); William F. Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1059 (1981). Works emphasizing the benefits of inflexibility (or less flexibility) include DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION (1993); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Oliver
Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCIENCE 1926
(2003).
2. See Ahjond S. Garmestani et al., Panarchy, Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy
Options for Building Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1036, 1039 (2009) (arguing that environmental law
must change in order "to confront emerging, cross-scale, and cross-boundary challenges.").
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flexibility." 3 However, not many people seem to be arguing for greater
inflexibility.
This Article has several purposes. The first is to provide specific historical
examples of contexts-recreational hunting and marine fisheries-in which
legislative grants of substantial flexibility have and have not, respectively, led
to good outcomes. Consistent with arguments made by past proponents of
inflexibility, our examples suggest that flexibility, especially when combined
with scientific uncertainty, can render decision-making processes vulnerable to
harmful pressure from concentrated interests. Second, these observations
suggest that legislators should not import enhanced flexibility into
environmental statutes across the board. And they ought to be particularly
careful when enhancing flexibility in contexts featuring high interest-group
power differentials and high degrees of scientific uncertainty. This observation
is particularly salient given universal agreement that climate change will
increase levels of uncertainty across all natural resources. In fact, it leads to a
paradox: On the one hand, uncertainty and flexibility appear to be dangerous in
combination, as uncertainty allows regulators the flexibility to bestow favorable
decisions on powerful groups. On the other hand, uncertain conditions would
seem to demand more flexibility. Resolving this paradox in specific statutory
contexts will require serious thinking.
We begin in Part II by summarizing the environmental law and
management scholarship that has called for greater flexibility in the face of
climate change. From that literature, we distill three key components of the
discussions about flexibility: the need for procedural streamlining; the need for
more nuanced substantive standards; and the need to reduce reliance on historic
baselines as the basis for substantive standards. In Part III, we summarize the
history of flexibility in fisheries law and management. We describe the history
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the primary federal fisheries law, and how it has
moved over time from greater to lesser flexibility, both procedurally and
substantively. We note that the success of federal fisheries law appears to have
increased over time, just as flexibility has decreased. In Part IV, we discuss
flexibility in state and federal hunting laws. We note the extreme levels of
flexibility in most of these laws and the general conclusion that they have been
highly successful in their goal of restoring populations of the wildlife species
that are the main focus of hunting. In Part V, we discuss the implications of our
case studies. Our conclusion is that flexibility in fisheries law failed because of
the interaction of significant uncertainty in fisheries science and management
with the presence of significant, entrenched interest groups with a stake in
increasing take levels.
3. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity is Dead" - Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 9, 17 (2010).
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1. THE CALL FOR FLEXIBILITY
Climate change creates a range of challenges for law in general and for
environmental law in particular. It creates a dynamic future in which historical
baselines about environmental conditions will change, sometimes significantly.
It adds to existing uncertainty, because we often have little information about
how much change will occur, what direction change will occur in, and how
changes in different environmental resources will interact with each other.4
A widespread response in the academic literature has been to argue that
resource management agencies will need greater flexibility to allow for
appropriate responses and adaptation to climate change.5 The argument is that
flexibility will be required to address the dynamic nature of climate change. For
example, some management agencies have implemented some resource laws
through the use of historical baselines as a guideline or factor in goal setting.6
However, climate change may render these baselines obsolete in the future, and
new reference points or regulatory standards that can move in concert with the
dynamic changes caused by climate change may represent a more desirable, not
to mention feasible, approach to resource management.7
These scholars also argue that flexibility is required for agencies to deploy
"adaptive management," widely seen as a central component of any effective
response to climate change.8 Adaptive management can take a range of forms,
most of which involve iterative cycles of management, monitoring, and
adjustment in future management in response to the on-the-ground impacts of
4. See generally MARINE ECOSYSTEMS AND GLOBAL CHANGE (Manuel Barange et al. eds.,
2010); WILDLIFE IN A CHANGING WORLD-AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 IUCN RED LIST OF
THREATENED SPECIES (Jean-Christophe Vid, Craig Hilton-Taylor & Simon N. Stuart eds., 2008);
CLIMATE VARIABILITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FISHERIES (Michael H. Glantz ed., 1992).
5. Scholars and managers also identify a range of nonlegal challenges for climate change
adaptation, such as political pressure, budget limitations, and fragmented agency authority. Robert L.
Fischman & Jillian R. Rountree, Adaptive Management, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 19, 22 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds.,
2012).
6. Id. at 20 (describing the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service's approaches to managing the National
Wildlife Refuge system and to implementing the Endangered Species Act).
7. See, e.g., Carl Folke et al., The Problem of Fit Between Ecosystems and Institutions: Ten
Years Later, 12 ECOLOGY AND SOC'Y, June 2007, at art. 30 ("[M]odem natural resource management
has been successful at rapidly achieving a set of narrowly defined goals . . .. The field has relied on the
use of fixed rules for achieving constant yields, as in fixed carrying capacity of animals and fixed
maximum sustainable yields (MSY) of fish and forest products.... [However,] [m]anagement
institutions, like fisheries, forestry, and agricultural and other governmental boards, became more rigid
and less responsive to critical changes in the ecosystem."); Adam Markham, Potential Impacts of
Climate Change on Ecosystems: A Review of Implications for Policymakers and Conservation
Biologists, 6 CLIMATE RES. 179, 188 (1996) ("Climate change too is often seen as a future problem that
is currently insignificant in comparison to more immediate pressures. This results in development of
conservation strategies that will sometimes be in place for decades, but which have not taken future
environmental changes, including climate, into account.").
8. Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 19 ("There is a virtual consensus that adaptive
management must be a key element of adaptation in conservation and environmental management.").
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management.9 Adaptive management takes an experimental view of
management actions and values quick responses to new information or
emergent problems.'0 The appeal of this approach in the context of climate
change is that it can help reduce the uncertainty about the impacts of climate
change on environmental resources as well as the uncertainty about the
appropriate management responses to those impacts." Adaptive management
features an iterative process that allows for ongoing and continual change in
management, potentially necessary in the face of the dynamism associated with
climate change.12
Given our objective of evaluating whether flexibility has historically been
successful in environmental and natural resources law and management, we
require a more specific and operationalized definition of flexibility. Two main
themes stand out from the literature: one, less "front-end" analysis before
management decisions are made, and more "back-end" analysis based on
ongoing monitoring that allows for repeated reconsideration and adjustment of
management decisions;'3 and two, less rigid management or regulatory
9. For an overview of adaptive management, see DEP'T OF INTERIOR, CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT?, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/ppa/upload/Chapterl.pdf;
CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).
10. WALTERS, supra note 9.
I1. Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 19 (Adaptive management's "strengths of flexibility
and 'learning while doing' recommend it across the full spectrum of adaptation challenges."); see also
id. at 23-24 ("[L]aws, policies, and management hat pertain to climate change must be supple enough
to confront this uncertainty" created by climate change).
12. See, e.g., Emma L. Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural
Resources Enhance Resilience to Climate Change?, 9 ECOLOGY AND Soc'Y, Dec. 2004, at art. 10
("Action to adapt and maintain resilience in the face of climate change requires adjustment by
governments . . . In effect, sustainable resource management requires government structures that are
empowered to make collective decisions."); Steven M. Winnett, Potential Effects of Climate Change on
U.S. Forests: A Review, 11 CLIMATE RES. 39, 47 (1998) ("As no model accounts adequately for all of
the components important to determining forests' response to climate change, it is important that no
model's projections be taken as the ultimate answer. All results need to viewed with an eye to what they
say about a piece of the whole picture and how they help reduce the uncertainty in the understanding of
these issues.").
13. Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2011) ("In most instances, virtually all agency attention and
resources are directed at the initial decision, regardless of how little information there is to make the
decision. Once an initial decision is made ... the agency rarely revisits it in any systematic way to adjust
the decision or learn from its successes or limitations for future actions."); J.B. Ruhl, General Design
Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems-With Applications to Climate
Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1392-93 (2011) [hereinafter Ruhl, General Design
Principles] ("The system's fixation on predecisional environmental assessment, cost-benefit analysis,
records of decisions, and judicial review litigation has pushed the system toward a 'front-end' focus on
reliability and efficiency that has made adaptive management exceptionally difficult to implement."); id.
at 1396 (arguing there is a need to "deemphasize the front-end focus, which assumes all effects can be
predicted and assessed before the decision, and introduce formal follow-up mechanisms demanding that
the decision maker integrate new information into an ongoing decision adjustment process"); Robin
Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1, 42 (2014) ("[W]e should recast administrative procedure not as a one-time, final-agency-decision-
then-judicial-review process, but rather as a recurring process of punctuated 'final' decision[ ]making,
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standards overall, with standards that are more easily changed or altered to
reflect changing environmental conditions.14
A. Procedural Flexibility
By "front-end" analysis, scholars and managers generally refer to the
panoply of predecisional analytic requirements required by statutes such as the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),15 the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),1 6 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 17 before an administrative
agency decision can be finalized.'8 These requirements may include, but are
not necessarily limited to, thorough responses to public comments on draft
regulations,19 analysis of whether a proposed agency decision will jeopardize
the existence of a species listed for protection under the ESA,20 and analysis of
the environmental impacts of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives in
an environmental impact statement, all of which must be completed before any
public participation, and judicial review somewhat akin to continuing jurisdiction in the courts."); J.B.
Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL.
L. 363, 416 (2010) [hereinafter Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation] ("[L]egal scholars have begun to
question the efficacy of using conventional comprehensive front-end environmental impact assessments
and cost-benefit analyses in climate change adaptation decisions ... [and] rather to shift their
methodological fundamentals toward a more adaptive 'back-end' approach. The critical component of
this approach is to scale back (but not abandon) the comprehensive front-end focus, which assumes all
effects can be predicted and assessed before the decision, and introduce formal follow-up mechanisms
demanding that the decision maker integrate new information into an ongoing decision adjustment
process.").
14. See, e.g., Craig R. Allen et al., Adaptive Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENvrL.
MGMT. 1339, 1343 (2011); Craig, supra note 3, at 63 (calling decision makers to "[i]nterpret or amend
existing laws to allow principled flexibility regarding environmental management goals to reflect
changing baseline conditions"); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice
of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16, 53-54. (2011). Unfortunately,
beyond that level of generality, the literature often has broadly divergent opinions about how these
principles should be implemented in specific ways for specific laws.
15. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372,
7521 (2012).
16. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012)
17. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
18. See, e.g., Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 21 (discussing NEPA); Sandra Zellmer &
Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration
from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB. L. REV. 893, 946 (2009) (discussing the ESA); J.B.
Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MiNN. J.L. SC. & TECi. 21, 50, 53
(2005) (discussing APA).
19. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (2015) (NEPA regulation setting forth the stages for environmental
impact statements (EIS), including preparation of a Draft EIS, a period to receive public comments, and
issuance of a Final EIS to respond to such comments).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 ("Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of
the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . .. is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.").
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agency decision can proceed.2 1 The critique is that these significant front-end
analytic requirements impose high fixed costs on any individual agency
decision-and therefore deter agencies from making decisions in the first
place.22 Agency aversion to repeated decision making is problematic for
climate change adaptation in two ways. First, the dynamic nature of climate
change might require the regular revision of management or regulatory
decisions in order to keep pace with changing environmental conditions;
second, adaptive management necessarily requires the ability to be ready,
willing, and able to undertake repeated reconsideration and revision of prior
management or regulatory decisions.23
21. See Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 35 (noting current legal system involves "use of
'front-end' analytical tools comprehensively conducted and concluded prior to making the decision
final"). Additional analytic requirements may also be imposed by other statutes, regulations, or
executive orders. For instance, regulations that have a "major" economic impact frequently have to
undergo a thorough cost-benefit analysis, and some scholars have identified these requirements as also
impeding adaptive management. See Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 413-17.
22. Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 21 ("Administrative procedure is a slow and cautious
process, reflecting the priority that courts and legislators place on circumscribing agency authority and
facilitating public participation."); id. at 21-22 (stating that processes such as NEPA "can discourage
change even when the proposed actions pertain to conservation or natural resources" and that NEPA's
"demand for fully articulated, long-term analysis-paired with the theory that nature can and should stay
the same-stiffens law and policy. While procedural safeguards provide increased assurance that the
agency is not overstepping its bounds, such procedures can limit an agency's ability to adapt."); Ruhl,
supra note 18, at 30, 35 (arguing that "front-end" analysis by agency deters adaptive management by
making decisions more costly and therefore reducing the incentive to do regular updates of decisions);
id. at 38 (noting that agencies that do nothing avoid NEPA compliance requirements, creating a "strong
disincentive to establishing and retaining long-term adaptive management programs"); Allen et al.,
supra note 14, at 1343; Camacho, supra note 13, at 1413-17, 1437; Craig & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 30,
33, 43-44; id at 36-37 (noting that while agency rules in theory are open to ongoing adjustment, "under
contemporary administrative law, each rulemaking effort-even the amendment or modification of a
prior rule-is evaluated as a separate legal event, not an ongoing process of agency learning and
adaptation.").
23. See, e.g., Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 18, at 946 ("Adaptive management may also be
hindered by legal obstacles posed by the ESA, which requires consultation for all discretionary federal
actions that may adversely affect a listed species or its critical habitat. Adaptive management requires
sufficient flexibility in applicable management mandates and sufficient resilience in ecological resources
in order to experiment."); Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 31 ("Adaptive management's iterative
cycles of planning, monitoring, evaluating, and recalibmting fine-tunes information, expertise, and
(ultimately) management."); Camacho, supra note 13, at 1414 ("[A]gencies are not required or
encouraged to monitor past decisions, adjust such decisions to reflect new information or changed
circumstances, or be more effective over time at achieving regulatory goals."); Craig & Ruhl, supra note
13, at 37 ("[T]he agency is supposed to 'get it right' at each pronouncement and to 'keep it right' until
new information or changed circumstances justifies a change" but "adaptive management allows-even
demands-continual managerial flexibility in the face of system complexity.").
Scholars and managers often argue that he rigidity of environmental and administrative law contributes
to agency cultures that avoid risk taking and decision making, again problematic in a world of a
changing climate. Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 20 ("Inertia dominates environmental law and
its implementing institutions. Institutional caution and risk aversion may hamper environmental aw's
ability to adapt and remain functional in the face of sweeping changes, such as climate change."); id. at
21-22 ("[M]ost federal agencies maintain a culture of 'status quo.' Deviating from the status quo
involves political risk. New information may show that agency change is necessary or prudent, but some
personnel treat information as 'troublesome' because of its tendency to provoke change.").
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While the diagnosis of the problem is fairly universal in the literature,
there is less consensus about the remedy for the malady. The most common
proposal is to adjust or reduce public participation in, and judicial review of,
administrative agency decisions.24 The theory is that these are the elements that
drive the (excessively) thorough front-end analysis: Public participation
imposes burdens by creating a forum in which the agency must respond to
comments through additional analysis.25 Judicial review directly burdens
agencies by requiring them to defend their front-end actions in court, and to
redo the various procedural steps if the court finds the agency's efforts
inadequate. It also imposes indirect burdens because agencies, aware of the
possibility of judicial review, spend extra resources to make their analyses and
responses to comments "bulletproof."26
The utility of these front-end analyses is often questioned in light of the dynamism and uncertainty
produced by climate change. If the future will change, and in uncertain ways, the benefits of a thorough,
upfront analysis of environmental impacts may be reduced. See Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at
35 (noting current legal system involves "the assumption of a robust capacity to predict and assess
environmental impacts and overall costs and benefits of a proposed action"); Melinda Harm Benson &
Asako B. Stone, Practitioner Perceptions ofAdaptive Management Implementation in the United States,
18 ECOLOGY AND Soc'Y, Sept. 2013, at art. 32 ("NEPA makes a number of assumptions that are at odds
with [adaptive management], including the assumption that . .. resource managers already have the
knowledge of natural systems needed to assess environmental impacts."); Melinda Harm Benson &
Ahjond S. Garmestani, Embracing Panarchy, Building Resilience, and Integrating Adaptive
Management Through a Rebirth of the National Environmental Policy Act, 92 J. ENvTL. MGMT. 1420,
1424 (2011) (stating that front-end analytic requirements under NEPA assume knowledge and
predictability of ecosystems that does not exist and place managers "in an untenable position.");
Garmestani et al., supra note 2, at 1042 (stating that front-end analysis is difficult or impossible given
dynamism and uncertainty of climate change impacts); Camacho, supra note 13, at 1436-37 ("In general
administrative law continues to task natural resource agencies with providing front-end, comprehensive,
and conclusive strategies for managing what are typically very complex systems and problems about
which there regularly is incomplete information."); Ruhl, General Design Principles, supra note 13, at
1396 ("[E]nvironmental law ... must be unshackled from comprehensive rational planning and other
'front-end' decision process methods such as predecisional environmental assessment and cost-benefit
analysis. These methods depend too heavily on assumptions of stationarity and predictability to respond
effectively to the realities of climate change.").
24. RuhI Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 419 (stating that adaptive management
"will require that environmental law relax its front-end gatekeeper grip as well as accommodate new
forms of public participation and judicial review"); Craig, supra note 3, at 66-67 ("[Plublic lands
managers may need some form of general planning requirements coupled with abbreviated
administrative procedures for specific implementation decisions, periodic rather than continual judicial
review for rationality, the ability to rely on postdecisional evaluations rather than predecisional
justifications, or increased emergency authorities in order to achieve true capacity for adaptive
management in the face of climate change impacts.").
25. Public participation may also, in and of itself, create time delays to allow for the public to
participate, and these delays may impede repeated agency reconsideration of its decisions. See Fischman
& Rountree, supra note 5, at 32 ("[I]ncreased flexibility in rulemaking procedures might allow for faster
action when necessary to deal with some of the fast-spreading problems of climate change, such as
drought or flood.").
26. Ruhl, supra note 18, at 30, 35 (arguing that public participation and judicial review create
strong incentives for agencies to do thorough front-end analysis) ("Most of this pre-decisional activity is
geared toward serving two goals: public participation and judicial review."); id. at 36 ("It is little wonder
that, having to operate in an atmosphere in which each decision involves so much 'front-end'
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Adjustment or reduction in both public participation and judicial review
would reduce the incentives for agencies to "front-end" analyses, and therefore
increase their willingness to do the repeated review and reconsideration of
decisions that is necessary for climate change adaptation.2 7 Some scholars
frame this as reducing the heavy emphasis that administrative law generally
places on thoroughly vetting agency decisions before they can become "final"
such that an agency can implement them.28 Scholars in general do not call for
the complete elimination of public participation or judicial review, but instead
for focusing public participation and judicial review on more significant agency
decisions, and leaving smaller-scale agency implementation decisions with
reduced or no public participation or judicial review requirements.29 However,
some scholars do specifically focus on litigation as a primary obstacle to
effective adaptive management and climate change adaptation.30
Alternatively, there are some commentators who argue that the appropriate
legal response to encourage climate change adaptation is more public
preparation designed largely in anticipation of the onslaught of the public's 'participation' and judges'
'hard looks,' many agencies display an aversion to adaptation.").
27. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 36 (making proposals to adjust public participation and
judicial review in order to shift these incentives).
28. Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 19 ("[T]he fixed nature of environmental law and the
importance of finality in administrative procedure raise difficulties when grafting adaptive management
onto existing legal regimes."); Benson & Stone, supra note 23 ("NEPA makes a number of assumptions
that are at odds with [adaptive management], including the assumption that there is a single, final
'agency action' rather than a series of iterative processes."); Allen et al., supra note 14, at 1343 (2011)
("Legal certainty does not mesh well with environmental unpredictability. . . . The certainty of law and
institutional rigidity often limit the experimentation that is necessary for adaptive management."
(citations omitted)); id. ("[W]e see the fundamental conflict between a linear legal process (i.e.,
administrative law) based on 'stationarity' versus an environmental management framework (i.e.,
adaptive management) based on the realization of dynamic systems characterized by 'surprise."'
(citations omitted)); Benson & Garmestani, supra note 23, at 1426 (A "significant obstacle is the fact
that administrative law regimes assume there is a 'final agency action' that allows for judicial review."
(citations omitted)); Camacho, supra note 13, at 1437; Craig & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 36 ("[Tihe many
procedural drivers toward finality in administrative law-the extensive requirements for front-end
justification to produce a judicially defensible final agency action-effectively end further deliberation
and debate over the agency's decision, both publicly and within the agency. As such, they act as barriers
to full agency implementation of true adaptive management." (citations omitted)).
29. See Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological
Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 1002-03 (2009) (suggesting public participation requirements in
environmental law may need to be tailored or changed in order to allow for adaptive management by
limiting participation for implementation, but maintaining it for major decisions); Craig & Ruhl, supra
note 13, at 30, 33, 43-44 (proposing statutory revisions in which judicial review and public participation
would be focused on major decisions with less public participation for implementation details). For an
example of scholars calling for maintenance of some level of judicial review even in the context of
adaptive management, see Benson & Garmestani, supra note 23, at 1426 ("[Any] iterative process will
need to be held accountable through enforceable mechanisms in administrative law.").
30. See Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 428; see also Benson & Stone, supra
note 23 (describing a survey of natural resource practitioners participating in adaptive management
training that found that a majority see law as an obstacle to adaptive management, specifically the
presence of lawsuits).
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participation in environmental decision making.3 1 Others argue that NEPA
analyses may facilitate climate change adaptation by forcing agencies to
consider climate change impacts that might otherwise have gone ignored.32
B. Substantive Flexibility
In the second category are proposals to alter the substance (rather than the
procedure) of environmental law to account for the dynamic future that climate
change will produce by adopting less rigid management or regulatory
standards. In this context, many scholars argue that current environmental and
natural resources law relies heavily on a preservationist or baseline approach,
where historical conditions are used to judge whether management or
regulatory standards have been satisfied, or whether restoration or mitigation
goals have been met.33 These historical standards, however, will be much less
useful in a future where environmental conditions are changing with the
climate.34
31. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 307, 350 (2007) (calling for more public participation to make
regulation more adaptive by bringing in more information, perspectives, and monitoring).
32. For instance, a survey of public land management professionals found that they believe that
NEPA can enable adaptation by forcing consideration of climate change impacts in agency decision
making, but statutes with substantive standards such as the ESA or NPS Organic Act are more of an
obstacle to adaptation. Robert L. Glicksman, Governance of Public Lands, Public Agencies, and Natural
Resources, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS,
supra note 5, at 441, 466 (citing Lesley Jantarasami et al., Institutional Barriers to Climate Change
Adaptation in U.S. National Parks and Forests, 15 ECOLOGY AND SOC'Y, Dec. 2010, at art. 33); see also
JOEL B. SMITH ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A
CALL FOR FEDERAL LEADERSHIP 29 (2010) (identifying NEPA as key component of adaptation for
similar reasons); see also Benson & Garmestani, supra note 23, at 1424-25 (calling for a substantive
standard under NEPA to mandate environmental resilience, "an affirmative obligation to engage in
mitigation of environmental impacts.").
33. Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 20 ("The substantive standards of environmental law
generally reflect a homeostatic view of nature, attempting to preserve or, when necessary, restore natural
areas to some previous state.").
34. Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 5, at 3, 12 ("Much of environmental law
assumes a baseline environment and seeks to preserve it. Where that environment has been degraded,
the law seeks to restore it. But as a result of climate change the environmental baseline is shifting in
many ways; attempting to stay in the same place is often futile, and laws that try to tie us down to where
we have been can prevent us from moving as gracefully as possible to where we must go."); Fischman
& Rountree, supra note 5, at 23 ("The slow, fixed governance within environmental law will be a
problem for climate change adaptation. As will be further explored in the next section, climate change
demands flexibility. Moreover, climate change will prove unpredictable and transformative.
Consequently, fixed laws relying on a preservationist or restorationist perspective will appear out of
touch and will eventually fail in the face of climate change."); Garmestani et al., supra note 2, at 1039
("The problem is that the rigidity of current environmental law, laws that were so successful at
protecting the environment for many years, is now the aspect of the law that does not allow it to confront
emerging, cross-scale, and cross-boundary challenges."); Camacho, supra note 13, at 1426-27; Ruhl,
Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 392; Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with
Law That Bends Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 63-74 (2010); Craig,
supra note 3, at 17, 35.
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Relatedly, some scholars argue that rigid management or regulatory
standards are problematic because they obstruct the experimentation needed for
adaptive management or to adjust to new climate conditions,3 5 and because
they prevent agencies from acknowledging the uncertainty inherent in their
management and regulatory decisions.36 Practitioners appear to agree with
these critiques-particularly with respect to the ESA.37
In general, the calls by scholars are not for the wholesale repeal of the
relevant standards, but instead for tweaks that will allow for the adjustment of
relevant standards where climate change has made them irrelevant,
unattainable, or where they create too much interference the experimentation
adaptive management requires.38 Proposals generally recognize the need for
some enforceability in the system based on clear, specific prescriptive statutory
standards, but call for fewer of those standards, or at least standards with
somewhat softer edges.3 9
35. Fischman & Rountree, supra note 5, at 31-32 (citing Project XL, an EPA pilot project, as a
model of flexibility because it eased regulation where other benefits were provided and gave grants for
experimentation with new procedures for regulation).
36. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 47-48 (arguing that agencies need the ability to say admit
there is uncertainty about whether a proposed management choice will achieve the relevant statutory
goals and that under current law this admission will often lead courts to strike down the agency's
decision).
37. Benson & Stone, supra note 23 (describing a survey of natural resource practitioners
participating in adaptive management training that found a majority see law as an obstacle to adaptive
management, specifically the requirement of specific management outcomes); Glicksman, supra note
32, at 466 (survey of public land management professionals found that they believe statutes with
substantive standards such as the ESA or NPS Organic Act are an obstacle to adaptation); see also
Garmestani et al., supra note 2, at 1040 ("In its current form, the ESA does not have the necessary
flexibility in its regulatory language to effectively implement adaptive responses to changing
environmental conditions.").
38. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 34, at 63-74 (suggesting the use of "moving baselines" to
allow for change while still constraining our desire to satisfy short-term, myopic preferences at the
expense of long-term environmental degradation); Craig, supra note 3, at 17 (noting the need to balance
flexibility required for climate change adaptation with ability to prevent political pressure that weakens
environmental law by using "principled flexibility" which would "distinguish in legally significant ways
uncontrollable climate change impacts from controllable anthropogenic impacts on species, resources,
and ecosystems that can and should be actively managed and regulated, and . . . implement consistent
principles for an overall climate change adaptation strategy."). In outlining her proposal, Craig
emphasizes that many existing historic standards might still be maintained because they retain their
utility even in a future dominated by climate change. Id at 63-64. For instance, many "anti-backsliding
requirements" in pollution control law may be still useful and "many existing laws already contain
provisions that are sufficiently flexible to address climate change impacts to baseline ecological
conditions." Id. at 63. However, CWA antidegradation provision may have to be changed. Id. at 64.
39. See Ruhl, General Design Principles, supra note 13, at 1397 ("Rigidly relying on fixed,
uniform regulatory instruments, such as technology standards and regulatory prescriptions, forecloses
adaptation to the kind of evolving, complex problems climate change adaptation will present.
Governance institutions will need a broader array of instruments-ranging from 'hard' prescriptive
mandates to 'soft' incentive- and information-based tools-to test for leverage over the more tractable
attributes of climate change adaptation problems over time."); see also Ruhl, Climate Change
Adaptation, supra note 13, at 425.
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However, there is less consensus on these points compared to proposals to
change the procedural structure of environmental law. Some scholars argue that
reducing or eliminating clear, specific standards and goals risks undermining
the effectiveness of environmental law, in particular its ability to resist political
pressure and reject myopic decision making that would sacrifice long-term
environmental quality for short-term economic gain.40 For example, the
"maximum sustained yield" (MSY) standard that is the basis for fisheries
management in the United States has been criticized as too malleable to ensure
effective environmental protection and therefore inadequate to ensure
adaptation to climate change.4 1 A related concern is that agencies may abuse
the discretion granted to them by procedural and substantive reforms intended
to facilitate adaptive management.42
To provide a specific standard that we can use in our analysis in this
Article, we have synthesized these various perspectives to characterize the
dominant trends. According to this literature, a flexible natural resource
management law is one that motivates and empowers management agencies to
respond to changes in the availability or condition of natural resources.
Specifically, a flexible regime will:
40. See, e.g., Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and
Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239 (2008); Doremus, supra note
34, at 63-74. As an example of the tension that balancing flexibility and rigidity creates for some of
these proposals, see Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 18, at 942 (contending agencies need clear
guidance to overcome inertia and special interests, but management "must be unfettered from rigid
consensus building requirements and free to experiment 'without constant micromanagement."'); see
also Folke et al., supra note 7, at 46 ("Resource users may have very specific desires from a highly
complex ecosystem, and they may tend to focus their management actions narrowly, ignoring side
effects. In the area of environmental regulation, bureaucratic micromanagement through command-and-
control policies often causes unintended consequences, or drives the regulated user to search for
loopholes."); but see Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. EcON. REV. 560,
564 (1983) ("[Afllowing flexibility to react to information or to select actions will not necessarily
improve performance if there is uncertainty about how to use that information or about when to select
particular actions. Thus, an agent's overall performance may actually be improved by restricting
flexibility to use information or to choose particular actions.").
41. See Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 18, at 902 (citing the Magnuson-Stevens Act's MSY
and related Optimum Yield standards as examples because they are overly vague and allows for too
much special interest manipulation); Craig, supra note 3, at 47 ("[O]ne of the more troubling legacies of
natural resource management in the United States is that 'sustainable yield' standards tend to err on the
side of more human harvest or extraction rather than institutionalizing any kind of precautionary
principle or margin of error in favor of the species or ecosystem."); see also Brian Walker et al.,
Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, 9 ECOLOGY AND SOC'v,
Dec. 2004, at art. 5 (critiquing MSY standards as ineffective and unsustainable); but see Folke et al.,
supra note 7, at 38 (arguing that the MSY concept is an example of rigid, inflexible legal structure that
interferes with effective natural resource management).
42. See, e.g., Courtney Schultz & Martin Nie, Decision-Making Triggers, Adaptive Management,
and Natural Resource Law and Planning, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 443, 450-51, 518-20 (2012) (pointing
to Forest Service 2005 and 2008 draft planning regulations as example of the risk that agencies will
abuse discretion granted by adaptive management and calling for enforceable, clear, and reliable
monitoring and triggers for effective adaptive management in order to constrain agency discretion).
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* Give agencies the power to act quickly by curtailing or streamlining
ordinary procedural mechanisms, such as environmental review, public
participation, and judicial review;
* Contain less concrete and more nuanced substantive standards (less
specific statutory restrictions on agency action, more substantive
agency discretion); or,
* Free agencies from the obligation to use preservationist or historical
baselines for purposes of goal setting.
11. FLEXIBILITY IN FISHERIES LAW
Within the field of natural resources law, two of the most flexible legal
regimes are federal laws regulating commercial and recreational ocean fishing,
primarily the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(Magnuson-Stevens Act),4 3 and state laws regulating recreational hunting.44
Congress and state legislatures incorporated flexibility features into these legal
regimes primarily because wildlife populations fluctuate naturally and, often,
unpredictably.45 Given these variable populations, the only way to ensure that
fishing and hunting will be sustainable over the long term is to allow
management agencies the freedom to adjust harvest levels in response to
changes in the condition of the resource.4 6 Because populations can fluctuate
rapidly, laws must also allow management agencies to make decisions quickly.
A. The Marine Fisheries Regime
The U.S. Department of Commerce and its National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are responsible for overseeing the
management of marine fisheries in U.S. waters, that is, from three to two
hundred nautical miles offshore.4 7 In 1976 Congress passed what is now known
43. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2012). Other laws that indirectly regulate ocean fishing include
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (2012), and the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
44. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 4501 (2015).
45. See GA. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., GEORGIA'S DEER MANAGEMENT PLAN: 2015-2024, at 6 (2014),
http://www.georgiawildlife.com/sites/default/files/uploads/wildlife/hunting/pdf/Game Mgmt/Dee/o20P
lan%202015-2024%2OFinal%2ODrafto2ll-19-14.pdf ("Starting in 1998 deer population estimates
gradually declined and dipped below 1 million in 2004, remaining stable at 900,000 to I million deer
since that time. This reduction in deer population to the current level was an objective of Georgia's Deer
Management Plan 2005-2014."); Annual Hunting Regulations, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies/regs.htm (last updated Apr. 11, 2011) ("The
purpose of annual hunting regulations is to keep harvests at levels compatible with a population's ability
to maintain itself.").
46. In other words, a constant harvest rate cannot work if the population drops to a point at which
the resource is being mined. A constant harvest rate might work if it were set at an extremely low level.
47. There are some exceptions. The federal government manages fisheries from 9 to 200 nautical
miles off the coast of Texas and the west coast of Florida. See Primer on Ocean Jurisdictions: Drawing
Lines in the Water, in AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 70-71 (2004),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full-color rpt/03a primer.pdf. States can
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as the Magnuson-Stevens Act.48 The Act established a "Fishery Conservation
Zone" stretching from the shores of the United States to a distance of two
hundred miles as well as a set of rules and institutions for managing fishing
activities within that zone.49 At the center of Congress's approach to domestic
fisheries management are eight Regional Fishery Management Councils, each
of which is responsible for managing fisheries within a sizeable fraction of
federal waters.50
The voting membership of each council is comprised of two groups. The
first group consists of what are known as "mandatory" members.51 These are
state and federal officials: the head of each coastal state or territory's marine
fisheries agency and the NOAA Regional Administrator from that region of the
country.52 The second group of voting members consists of "appointed"
members.53 These members are citizens who have been nominated by coastal
state governors and then appointed to the council by the Secretary of
Commerce.54 Traditionally, governors draw heavily from fishing or fishing-
related industries in nominating citizens for council membership.55 Since the
Act was passed, industry representatives have filled, on average, about 80
percent of appointed seats.56
regulate fisheries occurring in federal waters in some cases. See Josh Eagle, Domestic Fishery
Management, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 275-77 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg &
Michael Sutton eds., 2008).
48. Fishery Conversation and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976). In 1980,
Congress renamed it the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act; in 1996, it became the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3275
(1980); Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2012).
50. Id. § 1852(a). NOAA directly regulates Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico fisheries for "highly
migratory species" such as sharks, tunas, and swordfish. Id. § 1854(g).
51. Id. § 1852(b)(1)(A).
52. Id
53. Id § 1852(b)(2)(A).
54. Id The 2006 Reauthorization Act added a requirement that the National Marine Fisheries
Service train new council members in the basic science and economics of fishery management. Id.
§ 1852(k).
55. Thomas A. Okey, Membership of the Eight Regional Fishery Management Councils in the
United States: Are Special Interests Over-Represented?, 27 MARINE POL'Y 193 (2003); JOSH EAGLE ET
AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS 12, 24 (2003),
http://www.apo-observers.org/docs/pew science taking stock.pdf. In this Article, the word "industry"
refers to commercial and recreational fishing, as well as fish processing. Although those groups and
their subgroups, for example, commercial line and trawl fishermen, often have conflicting interests, they
generally share important common interests: the maintenance of high catch levels and the minimization
of restrictions on fishing. Where we are discussing a subgroup in particular (often commercial fishing),
we mention that specifically in the text. The 2006 Reauthorization Act added a requirement that, with
respect to the Gulf of Mexico Council only, governors must include the name of one nonindustry person
on nomination lists submitted to the Secretary of Commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(D).
56. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 55, at 24.
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B. Flexibility Measures in the Magnuson-Stevens Act
Since the late nineteenth century, fisheries scientists, fishermen, and
regulators have understood that the size and location of marine fish populations
are subject to frequent, unpredictable, and sometimes rapid change.5 7 Causes of
population variability include predator-prey dynamics, diseases, disturbances,
and climate cycles.58 Flexibility measures incorporated into the Magnuson-
Stevens Act provide evidence that Congress was fully aware of the challenges
that constant and uncertain variability present to natural resource decision
makers.59 The table in Appendix A provides an example of changing scientific
advice and harvest limits in one fishery, Gulf of Mexico king mackerel.60 The
data show managers' ability to adjust catch limits quickly and dramatically, for
example, reducing the limit by about 25 percent in 1987 and increasing it by
about 28 percent in 1997.
Managers also have the power to readily adjust long-term goals in light of
new information. The Magnuson-Stevens Act does not obligate managers to
restore fish populations to predetermined, historical levels. Instead, the Act
directs managers to maintain fish populations at levels that produce something
the statute calls "optimum yield." 6 1 If key aspects of the marine environment
such as food availability and water temperatures change over time, and these
changes affect a particular fishery's optimum yield, there is nothing in the Act
that prevents managers from resetting the target.
Adjustments to the target population in the Pacific groundfish fishery
between 1997 and 2009 provide a good example of goal-setting flexibility.62
From 1982 to 1997, managers estimated that the optimum population (the
population that produces optimum yield) for ninety species managed under the
plan was 35 percent of the prefishing population.63 In 1997 based on three
scientific papers published between 1993 and 1995, managers adopted a more
conservative estimate, 40 percent of prefishing levels, for a subset of rockfish
57. See generally ERIK CHAPMAN, N.H. SEA GRANT COLL. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE & FISH
POPULATIONS, http://nsgl.gso.uri.edulnhu/nhugl 0001 .pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
58. Id.
59. For example, the Regional Fishery Management Councils were established "to exercise sound
judgment in the stewardship of fishery resources through the preparation, monitoring, and revision of
such plans under circumstances (A) which will enable the States, the fishing industry, consumer and
environmental organizations, and other interested persons to participate in, and advise on, the
establishment and administration of such plans, and (B) which take into account the social and economic
needs of the States." 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (2012).
60. SE. DATA, ASSESSMENT, & REVIEW (SEDAR), SEDAR 38 STOCK ASSESSMENT REPORT:
SOUTH ATLANTIC KING MACKEREL 29 tbl.2.5.4 (2014), sedarweb.org/docs/sar/SEDAR_38_SA_
SAR.pdf.
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(33), 1851(a)(1) (2012).
62. Management of this fishery is detailed in PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, PACIFIC COAST
GROUNDFISH FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN: FOR THE CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND WASHINGTON
GROUNDFISH FISHERY 22 (2014), http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/GFFMPFINAL
May2014.pdf.
63. Id. at 21-22.
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species included in the groundfish fishery.64 In 2000 "after an intensive review
of historic harvest rates, and current scientific literature on harvest rates and
stock productivity," the Pacific Fishery Management Council's scientific
advisors adopted new targets for some species, ranging from 30 to 50 percent
of prefishing levels.65
1. Procedural Flexibility: Giving Managers the Ability to Act Quickly
As a general matter, two statutes-the Administrative Procedure Act 66 and
the National Environmental Policy Act67-regulate the decision-making
processes of federal natural resource management agencies.6 8 Agency
compliance with the procedural requirements of these statutes is time
consuming and mandatory; thus while these laws do not necessarily restrict
agencies' ability to implement new measures or change course, they do limit
agencies' ability to do so quickly.69 Due to the unique decision-making
structure of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which gives primary authority for
decision making to the councils while giving NOAA the responsibility to
formally approve council decisions, the NEPA-compliance issues in federal
fishery management are particularly complex.70
That being said, in practice the fisheries governance system has managed
to produce thousands of annual management measures for the hundreds of
fisheries under management for nearly forty years.7 1 As illustrated by the
example of the Gulf of Mexico king mackerel fishery, the governance system
also often produces management measures that differ significantly from those
in place in prior years.
2. Flexibility in Substantive Standards and Goal Setting
The Magnuson-Stevens Act has always given NOAA and the councils a
great amount of discretion in setting population goals for specific fisheries. The
64. Id. at 22. A higher target population represents a more conservative approach because it
means that managers must leave more fish in the sea or, if the fishery is overfished, enter into a longer,
more stringent rebuilding protocol.
65. Id.
66. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372,
7521 (2012).
67. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
68. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
69. See, e.g., Lucas Bergkamp & Turner T. Smith, Jr., Legal and Administrative Systems:
Implications for Precautionary Regulation, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 434, 463 (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2001) ("[T]he APA
rulemaking process can slow down government decision[ ]making, particularly in conjunction with the
judicial review process.").
70. For a discussion of this division of roles and responsibilities, see Memorandum from Samuel
D. Rauch Ill, Deputy Assistant Adm'r for Regulatory Programs, to Reg'1 Adm'rs & Council
Coordination Comm., Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/
reg svs/Councils/ccc_2013/GNMFSNEPA PolicyDirective.pdf.
71. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 55, at 32.
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Act's National Standard One provides that "[c]onservation and management
measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the
optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry."72 The
Act currently defines "optimum yield" as "the amount of fish which. . . is
prescribed ... on the basis of the MSY from the fishery, as reduced by any
relevant economic, social, or ecological factor."7 3
The determination of a fishery's MSY is not dependent on any historical
baseline. Rather, it is a function of the current marine environment-the
potential of each stock of fish is dictated by environmental conditions such as
ocean temperature. Thus MSY changes with the underlying environmental
conditions. As three leading fisheries scientists put it, "environmental and
human factors ... cause us to expect that reproductive surplus relationships
[that is, sustainable yields] will not be stable in time."74 Nothing in the
Magnuson-Stevens Act prevents managers from adjusting MSY goals, as
shown by the example of the changes in goals for the Pacific groundfish
fishery.
The current language of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and implementing
regulations, quoted above, actually provide management councils with less
discretion than they had under the Act's original language. The original version
of the Act gave the councils wide latitude in setting annual catches, explicitly
allowing them to sacrifice biological goals, such as managing the fishery for
MSY, in order to produce short-term economic gains for the fishing industry.
Specifically, the original Act provided that catches should be set on the basis of
a fishery's MSY, "as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012). The Magnuson-Stevens Act contains ten National Standards
for fishery management. § 1851(a)(1)-(10). The National Standards express Congress's goals in the
form of enforceable statutory mandates. See Eagle, supra note 47 at 280-81.
73. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(e)(3)(i)(A) (2015). As discussed shortly, this definition of optimum yield
is a narrower one than originally existed under the Act.
MSY is the annual yield of fish (harvest) that is "as large as possible but nevertheless sustainable in the
long term." Andre E. Punt and Anthony D.M. Smith, The Gospel of Maximum Sustainable Yield in
Fisheries Management: Birth, Crucifixion and Reincarnation, in CONSERVATION OF EXPLOITED
SPECIES (John D. Reynolds et. al. eds., 2001). MSY is predicated on the assumption that fish
populations are density-dependent, that is, the degree to which the population can grow in a given period
is related to the size of the population at the beginning of that period. Id. Prior to human fishing a
population will be stable at its "carrying capacity" due to limited amounts of food or space resources.
Specifically, since resources sufficient to support a fish from birth to adulthood become available only
as adult fish die, the population's rate of increase equals its rate of natural mortality. Id. When natural or
human forces increase the mortality rate, the resulting availability of resources translates to a higher rate
of increase. If mortality rates become too high, overall productivity will decrease due to the lower
numbers of spawning adults. Id. The goal of fishery management is to maintain the spawning population
at the point at which total long-term productivity is at its highest, known as MSY, or Pmsy. See WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, COMMON FISHERIES POLICY REFORM: GETTING MSY RIGHT 1 (2011), http://awsassets
.panda.org/downloads/wwf msyoct20l lfinal.pdf.
74. Ray Hilbom et al., Sustainable Exploitation of Natural Resources, 26 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 45, 55 (1995).
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factor."75 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, some of the councils
regularly used the "as modified" language to increase catches above MSY-in
effect using it as a loophole to avoid taking the politically difficult steps
required for proper long-term management.76 Similarly, while National
Standard One in both the original and current Act requires councils to "prevent
overfishing,"77 the original Act contained no guidance to the councils as to how
they should do so and, more importantly, no required timeline for rebuilding
overfished stocks.
Prior to amending the Act in 1996, and again in 2006, Congress heard
testimony about the high rate of council management failures.78 During this
period, about 25 to 40 percent of council-managed fisheries were "overfished"
or "subject to overfishing"; testimony suggested that one of the primary causes
of these problems was that councils often did not follow scientific advice,
allowing them to avoid taking the controversial steps necessary to rebuild
overfished stocks and to end overfishing.79
In response, Congress made important changes in the Sustainable
Fisheries Act of 1996. First, Congress changed the definition of optimum yield,
substituting the word "reduced" for "modified."8 0 This change meant that, in
theory, the councils would no longer be free to set catch levels above those
recommended by their science advisors. The Sustainable Fisheries Act also
addressed the question of how the councils should respond to information
suggesting that stocks were overfished. Congress added a requirement that the
councils rebuild overfished stocks within a time period "as short as possible . . .
75. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 3, 90 Stat. 331,
336 (amended 1996, 2006).
76. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A HISTORY OF U.S.
MARINE FISHERIES POLICY 177 (2002); Timothy Hennessey & Michael Healey, Ludwig's Ratchet and
the Collapse ofNew England Groundish Stocks, 28 COASTAL MGMT. 187, 199-205 (2000).
77. § 301, 90 Stat. at 346.
78. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act: Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Fisheries of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp., 106th Cong. 41 (2000) (statement of Russell Sherman, Treasurer, Gulf of Maine
Fisherman's Alliance) ("I believe I have also experienced and suffered through one of the most dismal
failures of the management process .. . [which] has turned into an allocation fight, with the winners
being special interest groups, represented by well-funded lobbyists able to garner support on, or who are
actually members of, the New England Fishery Management Council. As a result, small owner operated
vessels from small fishery dependent coastal communities are forced out of the industry.").
79. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 109th Cong. 20 (2005) (statement of
Admiral James D. Watkins, Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Ocean Policy) ("The Commissioners felt
strongly that the Regional Fisheries Management Councils should be required to adhere to scientific
advice provided by the [Scientific and Statistical Committees]. This requirement is based on information
that a lack of adequate scientific information has not been the main culprit in most instances of
overfishing. Rather, a 2002 National Research Council report concluded that the problem in many cases
of overfishing was that the Regional Councils disregarded or downplayed valid scientific information
when setting harvest guidelines.") (citing NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND ITS ROLE IN THE
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE (2002)).
80. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, sec. 102, § 3, 110 Stat. 3559, 3562 (1996).
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and not to exceed ten years, except in cases where the biology of the stock of
fish [or] environmental conditions. . . dictate otherwise."81
In 2006 Congress once again attempted to narrow fishery managers'
substantive discretion.82 Most important, the 2006 amendments made ach
council's Scientific and Statistical Committee r sponsible for setting limits on
the discretion to set catch levels for the council. The amended Act required that
the councils "develop annual catch limits for each [managed fishery] that may
not exceed the fishing level recommendations of its scientific and statistical
committee."83 In addition, Congress required the councils to develop
accountability measures, that is, steps that councils would take in the event that
their decisions, in retrospect, turned out to be insufficient to rectify overfishing
problems or overfished conditions.84 These provisions were clearly directed at
increasing managers' fidelity to science and encouraging more conservative
decision making.85
C. Fisheries Management Not as Successful as Desired
Measuring the success of fisheries management under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act is a difficult undertaking. There are at least four ways to ask the
question "what would success look like?" Two metrics focus on biological or
ecological measures. First, are managed fish populations at levels close to or
above the levels that produce MSY? Second, have NOAA and the councils
taken steps, mandated by the statute, toward a broader, ecosystem approach to
management?86 Examples of a broader approach could include protecting fish
habitats from damage by fishing gear and minimizing the extent to which
fishing kills species such as seabirds, sea turtles, and marine mammals. The
third and fourth measures would focus on the attainment of economic and
political goals: Have NOAA and the councils managed fisheries toward
reducing the amount of excess capital in the fishing industry, a goal that many
81. Sec. 109, § 304, 110 Stat at 3585.
82. See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(6) (2012).
84. Id § 1852(h)(5).
85. See Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., supra note 79, at 20
(statement of. Admiral James D. Watkins, Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Ocean Policy) ("Further
exacerbating the problem of exceeding total allowable catch levels is the fact that neither NOAA
Fisheries nor the Secretary of Commerce have adequately exercised their authority to prevent the
Councils from taking such risky actions. .... Thus we are suggesting establishment of a safeguard in the
process by allowing SSC to set a total allowable catch that cannot be exceeded... The Commission also
made recommendations to help ensure the qualification and impartiality of SSC members, as well as
suggestions for strengthening and mandating a peer review process for fisheries information ... Full
implementation of this collection of measures would represent an important step toward reinstilling
confidence in the process by which fisheries science is collected, analyzed and used, reducing grounds
for unnecessarily burdensome lawsuits and the diversion of scarce resources toward competing
science.").
86. See 16 U.S.C. § 1882 (2012).
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see as key to long-term sustainability?87 To what extent does the fishery
management process allow meaningful input from traditionally
underrepresented groups, such as nonconsumptive users (conservation groups)
and, in some regions, recreational fishing interests?"
At a basic level, all interested parties would agree that the first question,
relating to the maintenance of healthy fish stocks, is the most important. NOAA
is the only source of comprehensive data on the status of the United States' fish
stocks. The agency began sporadically publishing reports on the overall
condition of U.S. fisheries in the early 1990s.89 These reports put each fish
stock into one of four categories: "unknown" (stock cannot be assessed ue to
insufficient data); "overutilized" (stock has been negatively impacted by
historically excessive levels of fishing); "underutilized" (stock could support
increased fishing pressure in the future); and "fully exploited" (population
somewhere between under- and overutilized). The data from these years show a
consistently high rate of overutilization, a clear symptom of management
failure.90
Table 1: Problems with U.S. Marine Stocks in the Early 1990s
Year Number of Overutilized Stocks




In the 1996 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Congress
mandated that NOAA publish annual data on the status of stocks. As set out in
87. See id. § 1861 a(b) (implementing a "fishing capacity reduction" program).
88. See id. § 1852(b)(2)(B) ("Me Secretary... shall ... ensure a fair and balanced
apportionment, on a rotating or other basis, of the active participants (or their representatives) in the
commercial and recreational fisheries under the jurisdiction of [each Regional Fishery Management]
Council.").
89. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OUR LIVING OCEANS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
U.S. LIVING MARINE RESOURCES, 1995 (1996), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.
30112075692829;view-lup;seq=3; NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OUR LIVING OCEANS:
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF U.S. LIVING MARINE RESOURCES, 1993 (1994), http://babel.hathitrust.org
/cgi/pt?id-ucl.31822009056540;view-lup;seq=309 (enter "157" into "Jump to" search box near upper
left of page corner, then select "Go"); NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE STATUS OF U.S.
LIVING MARINE RESOURCES, 1992 (1992); NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OUR LIVING
OCEANS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF U.S. LIVING MARINE RESOURCES, 1991 (1991), http://babel
.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucl.31822009056540;view-lup;seq=l.
90. Some of these early reports reported on two types of fisheries problems: overutilization and
overfished populations. The former, also known as "overfishing," occurs when the amount of fishing
effort in a fishery exceeds the amount needed to catch the MSY. The latter refers to a condition of the
stock, specifically, that the population of fish is significantly below the level capable of producing the
MSY. Because these early reports were inconsistent in their assessments of overfished populations, we
chose to put only data on overutilization in the table. The numbers on stock condition were similarly
consistent with overall management problems. Beginning in 2000, the government produced annual
statistics on overfishing and overfished fisheries.
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the table in Appendix B, these data show that management has been slowly
improving over the last fifteen years.91 NOAA's reports address not one, but
two types of management failures: "overfished" stocks, that is, stocks whose
population is well below the level necessary to produce an optimum annual
yield; and, stocks experiencing "overfishing," that is, a level of pressure greater
than needed to catch the optimum yield. This latter type of failure is the same
one the agency earlier called "overutilization." Since 2000, thirty-four total
stocks have been rebuilt, the number of stocks on the overfishing list decreased
from seventy-two to twenty-eight, and the number of stocks on the overfished
list decreased from ninety-two to forty. 92 These figures are based only on
stocks with a "known" status; for example, in 2013, 478 stocks and stock
complexes were federally managed, but overfished status determinations could
only be made for 48 percent of those.93
What is important to note about this data is that stocks improved as the
law became less flexible-i.e., as it imposed greater constraints on the
discretion of management councils and NOAA. Overfishing declined after the
1996 amendments, and continued to decline after the 2006 amendments.
II. FLEXIBILITY IN HUNTING LAW
A. General Flexibility ofHunting Laws in United States
Hunting is primarily (though not exclusively) regulated at the state level in
the United States.94 Hunting regulations are usually promulgated and enforced
by state fish and game agencies. In general, state legislatures give tremendous
leeway to these agencies in the development of hunting regulations:95 the
91. Each of the individual reports to Congress is available on NOAA's website. See Stock Status
Archive, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/fisherieseco/status
of fisheries/archive/stock status archive.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
92. Based on 2013 data. See NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STATUS OF STOCKS
2013: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF U.S. FISHERIES (2013), http://www.nmfs.
noaa.gov/sfa/fisherieseco/statusoffisheries/archive/stockstatus archive.html.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Both federal and state agencies regulate waterfowl and other migratory bird hunting. See infra
notes 115-119.
95. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 139 (2009) ("Many
legislatures, however, have given agencies scant guidance on how they should go about exercising their
considerable delegated powers."). A survey of state wildlife laws in the early 1990s showed that most
states give great leeway to administrative agencies in setting hunting seasons, bag limits, and often
methods of hunting as well. See RUTH S. MUSGRAVE & MARRY ANNE STEIN, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS
HANDBOOK (1993). For examples of states that granted broad discretion to their agencies to set hunting
rules, see id. at 73-74 (Arizona); id. at 121-22 (Colorado); id. at 190-92 (Idaho); id. at 218 (Indiana); id
at 243 (Kansas); id. at 251-52 (Kentucky); id. at 413-17 (Nevada); id. at 446-52 (New Jersey); id at
462 (New Mexico); id. at 504-05 (North Dakota); id. at 540-43 (Oregon); id. at 612-14 (Tennessee); id.
at 638 (Utah); id. at 675-76 (Washington). Some states imposed significant statutory restrictions on
hunting, but in general those restrictions focused on the methods of hunting, rather than on the duration
of hunting seasons or on bag limits. See, e.g., id. at 281-84 (Maine statutory rules focus on methods of
hunting); id. at 147 (Delaware statutory rules set some hunting season dates); id. at 170-73 (Georgia
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relevant statutory language is often a sweeping delegation of power to regulate
as needed to protect fish and wildlife populations.96
For example, in California the state Fish and Wildlife Commission
(Commission) is given "the power to regulate the taking or possession of birds,
mammals, fish, amphibia, and reptiles" in the state, except for commercial
hunting and fishing.97 The Commission can apply a regulation "to all or any
statutory provisions focus on hunting methods); id. at 206-10 (Illinois statutory provisions focus on
hunting methods); id. at 266-68 (Louisiana statutory provisions restrict hunting methods and set some
season dates that can be altered by agency); id. at 295-99 (Maryland statutory provisions restrict hunting
methods); id. at 310-14 (Massachusetts statutory provisions restrict hunting methods); id. at 347-51
(Minnesota statutes impose some method and bag limit restrictions); id. at 368-72 (Mississippi statutory
provisions restrict hunting methods, set seasons and bag limits); id at 430-34 (New Hampshire statutory
provisions restrict hunting methods and set some season lengths); id at 470-74 (New York statutory
provisions restrict hunting methods, set bag limits and season lengths); id. at 490-93 (North Carolina
statutory provisions impose some restrictions on hunting methods); id. at 556-61 (Pennsylvania
statutory provisions impose some hunting method restrictions); id at 586-91 (South Carolina sets most
hunting rules through statutory provisions); id. at 649-53 (Vermont statutes set deer season and hunting
methods but otherwise grant broad discretion to agency); id. at 699-702 (Wisconsin statutory provisions
set some restrictions on hunting methods).
State courts have generally concluded that broad grants of regulatory authority to fish and game
agencies are constitutional delegations of power. See, e.g., Bean v. McWherter, 953 S.W.2d 197, 198
(Tenn. 1997); Armstrong v. State, 958 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); Wyo. Coal. v. Wyo.
Game & Fish Comm'n, 875 P.2d 729, 734 (Wyo. 1994); FREYFOiLE &GOBLE, supra at 139.
96. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-302(a)(i) (2015) (giving the state fish and game agency
the power "[t]o fix season and bag limits, open, shorten or close seasons ... on any species or sex of
wildlife for any type of legal weapon, except predatoryanimals, predacious birds, protected animals, and
protected birds, in any specified locality of Wyoming, and to give notice thereof'); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 41-2-18 (2015) (authorizing state game, fish, and parks commission to issue regulations for the
"hunting, taking, killing, possession, sale, and transportation of all wild birds, wild animals, and wild
fish ... [tlhe devices, weapons, ammunition, traps, tackle, bait, lures, and equipment which may be used
to hunt, kill, capture or late any wild animal or fish if use of the above items would adversely affect he
health, safety, or welfare of people or wildlife resources" and the "establishment of, and the opening,
closing, modifying, or curtailing of hunting, fishing, and trapping seasons, if the seasons are not
established by statute"); WASH. REV. CODE § 77.04.047 (2015) (giving state fish and game commission
broad authority to set hunting rules that govern time, manner, and place of legal hunting); see also ARIC.
CONST. amend. XXXV, § 8 (providing that state fish and game "[c]ommission shall have the exclusive
power and authority to issue licenses and permits, to regulate bag limits and the manner of taking game
and fish and furbearing animals, and shall have the authority to divide the State into zones, and regulate
seasons and manner of taking game, and fish and furbearing animals therein, and Fix penalties for
violations. No rule or regulations shall apply to less than a complete zone, except temporarily in case of
extreme emergency.").
97. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 200 (West 2015). In California, as in many other states,
regulatory and enforcement authority is divided between two agencies. The Fish and Wildlife
Commission generally promulgates hunting regulations and sets overall hunting policy in the state; the
Department of Fish and Wildlife enforces the Commission's regulations, provides data and proposed
regulations for the Commission's consideration, and has some limited powers to promulgate regulations
as well. See About the Fish and Game Commission, California Department of Fish and Wildlife, CAL.
FISH & GAME COMM'N, http://www.fgc.ca.gov/public/information/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Proposed
Regulation, Caifornia Department of Fish and Wildlife, CA.GOv, https://www.wildlife.ca.
gov/Notices/Regulations (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). For an example of a regulation promulgated directly
by the Department, see Proposed Regulations for Possession of Mountain Lion Carcasses for Scientific
or Educational Purposes, California Department of Fish and Wildlife, CAL. DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE,
https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Notices/Regulations/Lion-Carcass-Possession (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
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areas, districts, or portions thereof' in the state "at [its] discretion" for "any or
all species or subspecies" of game birds and mammals in the following ways:
(a) Establish, extend, shorten, or abolish open seasons and closed seasons.
(b) Establish, change, or abolish bag limits and possession limits.
(c) Establish and change areas or territorial limits for their taking.
(d) Prescribe the manner and means of taking.
(e) Establish, change, or abolish restrictions based upon sex, maturity, or
other physical distinctions.98
Both the voters and the legislature in California (as in other states) have
imposed specific constraints on this regulatory discretion, but those constraints
are relatively narrow. For instance, the legislature in California has retained
regulatory authority over commercial fishing,99 has imposed specific standards
for hunting regulations for elk and antelope,100 prohibits the taking of certain
kinds of deer,10 1 prohibits hunting while intoxicated,102 prohibits hunting from
powerboats or airplanes,103 prohibits internet-controlled hunting,104 prohibits
hunting within 150 yards of homes,10 5 and prohibits the use of leaded
ammunition in California condor habitat.106 The voters of California have
imposed their own specific limits on agency discretion, prohibiting certain
kinds of traps to capture fur-bearing mammals,107 and the hunting of mountain
lions in most circumstances.0 8
Most of these specific constraints are relatively narrow, especially in
comparison to the sometimes excruciating detail of hunting regulations
promulgated by agencies in most states.10 9 The legislature has even given the
98. FISH & GAME § 203. The Commission has similar discretion for the taking of fish, amphibian,
and reptiles. Id. § 205.
99. Id. § 200.
100. Id. §§ 204(b)c), 331, 332. The constraints on agency discretion primarily relate to hunting
permit fees and the use of funds from those fees. Id.
101. Id. § 204(d) (prohibiting the Commission from authorizing hunting of "spotted fawns" which
are "young deer born that year which has spotted pelage and "spike bucks" which are "male deer with
unbranched antlers on both sides which are more than three inches in length."); id. §§ 458-459
(allowing certain counties to prevent the hunting of antlerless deer within their borders).
102. Id. § 3001.
103. Id. § 3002. State law also prohibits using motor vehicles to pursue or herd birds or mammals
for hunting. Id. § 3003.5.
104. Id. § 3003.
105. Id. § 3004.
106. Id. § 3004.5. Leaded ammunition has been identified as a major threat to the survival of the
endangered condor. Other specific statutory constraints include protections for listed state endangered
species. See, e.g., id. § 3511 (birds). And also restrictions on the use of dogs to chase bears and bobcats.
Id. §§ 3960.1-.6.
107. Id. § 3003.1. The legislature has imposed additional limits on trapping of fur-bearing
mammals. See id § 4004.
108. Id. §§ 4800-4810. The legislature has granted the Commission authority to allow the taking
of mountain lions in certain circumstances despite the initiative ban on mountain lion hunting.
109. For instance, the "user-friendly" version of the California's 2015-16 hunting regulations for
mammals (the version distributed to the hunting public) fills a seventy-one page book. See CALIFORNIA
2015-2016 MAMMAL HUNTING REGULATIONS HANDBOOK (2014), https://nrm.dfg.ca.gov/FileHandler
.ashx?DocumentlD-102351 &inline.
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Commission the power to override statutory limits in its discretion in
emergency circumstances.' 10 Thus, even with these specific statutory
constraints, the Commission's discretion remains extremely broad.
Preservationist or historical baselines play a relatively minor role in the
California regulatory system. The overall policy for California's fish and game
management is to "encourage the preservation, conservation, and maintenance
of wildlife resources under the jurisdiction and influence of the state,"
including the "perpetuat[ion] of all species of wildlife" in the state-but this
latter goal is balanced with other objectives such as "provid[ing] for the
beneficial use and enjoyment of wildlife by all citizens of the state" and
"maintain[ing] diversified recreational uses of wildlife, including the sport of
hunting."I1 1
The California statutory provisions authorize the Commission to undertake
regulatory efforts to prevent "scarcity" of "game fish, resident or migratory
birds, game or fur-bearing mammals, or amphibia."ll2 But the provisions only
authorize-rather than mandate-agency action; and note that the species
included in the provision can be nonnative introduced "game" species as well,
thus authorizing the Commission to protect introduced species as well as native
ones.113 Even here, the terms that are used (such as "scarcity" or "surplus")'114
are general enough that they need not be interpreted relative to historical
baselines, but instead relative to other standards (such as whether sufficient
game exist to support hunting activities).
The federal government's primary involvement in hunting law involves
regulation of the hunting of migratory birds such as waterfowl. The Migratory
Bird Treaty Act implements a series of treaties between the U.S. government
110. FisH & GAME § 219 (allowing Commission regulations to "supersede any section of this
code" where "necessary for the protection of fish, wildlife, and other natural resources under the
jurisdiction of the commission," and where the Commission "determines that an emergency exists or
will exist unless the action is taken"). Regulations under this provision can only be in place for up to
twelve months. Id § 219(b).
Ill. Id. § 1801.
112. Id. § 307; see also id. §§ 314-315 (authorizing agency to close land areas or streams to
protect newly stocked population or where necessary to "properly conserve" a population). Other
provisions authorize agency action to protect specific species or groups of species. Id. § 302 (black
bears); id. §§ 308.5 (mountain sheep generally); id. §§ 4900-4903 (bighorn sheep specifically); id
§§ 450-460 (deer); id. §§ 3951-3952 (elk). The deer provisions do require the agency to develop
management plans to provide for "the restoration and maintenance of healthy deer herds in the wild
state" but in conjunction with the "high quality and diversified use of deer." Id. § 453. The tule elk
provisions allow for "relocation" of tule elk in the state in areas that are "suitable" habitat, with no
restriction as to historical range. Id. § 3951.
113. See, e.g., id § 3950 (defining game mammals to include "feral pigs and European wild
boars").
114. See, e.g., id § 307; id § 325 (agency may increase hunting to manage "surplus" of game




and foreign countries to regulate the hunting of migratory birds.115 Federal law
also gives the relevant agency-the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)-
extremely broad discretion as to whether and how to regulate hunting of
migratory birds:
Subject to the provisions and in order to carry out the purposes of the
conventions, referred to in section 703 of this title, the Secretary of the
Interior is authorized and directed, from time to time, having due regard to
the zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, economic
value, breeding habits, and times and lines of migratory flight of such birds,
to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is
compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting, taking,
capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation,
carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, and to
adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing the same, in
accordance with such determinations.116
As the text of the statute makes plain, the FWS can implement almost any
regulatory system it wishes so long as it does not conflict with the relevant
migratory bird treaty. The treaties themselves do not impose many constraints:
The U.S. treaty with Canada only requires a closed season for migratory game
birds from March 10 to September 1, a maximum three-and-one-half month
open season for migratory game birds, and an absolute prohibition on the
hunting of migratory nongame birds, the commercial sale of migratory birds,
and the hunting of eggs and nests of migratory birds.117 But the treaty sets no
limits on the total number of migratory game birds that can be taken during the
open season, on the total number of migratory game birds that an individual can
take, or on methods of hunting migratory game birds.118 There is also no
mention in the statute or the relevant treaties about historical baselines or
population levels that must be maintained or are used to measure agency
performance (other than the initial listing of protected species)." 9
Of course, all the substantive flexibility in the world for agency regulation
can be meaningless if, in practice, the agency is either unable to regularly
update its regulations because of strict procedural requirements or because the
agency is reluctant to update its regulations for legal, political, or institutional
reasons. However, in the context of hunting laws state and federal agencies
115. Specifically, Canada, Mexico, Russia, and Japan. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §
712(1) (2012).
116. Id. § 704(a); see also id. § 712(2) ("The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue such
regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions of the" various migratory bird treaties.).
117. Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Can.,
Dec. 5, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 104-28 (1996), art. 11. Exceptions on these prohibitions exist for indigenous
subsistence hunting. Id.
118. Federal law does prohibit the use of bait to hunt migratory game birds. 16 U.S.C. § 704(b).
119. A federal court held that the FWS was required to protect a nonnative migratory species, mute
swans, under the Act. Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Congress later overrode that
ruling, restricting the MBTA's scope to species "that are native to the United States or its territories." Id
§ 703(b).
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often have streamlined procedural requirements that allow for the regular
updating of their regulations, and they frequently do update those regulations in
practice.
For instance, in California, deer hunting regulations are produced over a
three-meeting process. At the first meeting, the Commission receives
recommendations from its staff, the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW),
other public agencies, and the public.12 0 At the second meeting, the
Commission leaves time for public discussion of the regulations that were
presented at the first meeting, as well as time for presentations from DFW
regarding the proposed regulations and any objections raised to the
regulations.121 At the end of the second meeting, the Commission must
announce the regulations it intends to add, amend, or repeal.122 At the third
meeting, the Commission can choose to hear additional public comment
regarding the regulations.12 3 Final regulations must be published and
distributed within forty-five days.124 The entire process usually takes about five
months (the Commission's meetings occur roughly monthly).125 The
Commission can also issue emergency regulations based on a single
meeting.126 And while government actions in California generally must
undergo environmental review pursuant to the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA), a process that can add substantial amounts of time to the
regulatory procedure, state deer hunting regulations are exempt from CEQA
because the regulatory process is deemed functionally equivalent to CEQA
review.127
In practice, the Commission regularly updates its deer hunting regulations.
Every year, the Commission revises the number of deer that can be legally
harvested in various hunting zones and from deer herds around the state. The
quotas for any given zone may stay constant, but changes are made to the
quotas for at least some zones in every year.12 8
California's trout fishing regulations are also regularly revised. The
Commission has general regulations that apply to each of the seven regions
120. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 207(b) (West 2015).
121. Id. § 207(c).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id § 207(e).
125. For the Commission's 2013 regulatory schedule, which indicates the meeting dates when deer
hunting regulation revisions are to be considered, see Fish & Game Comm'n, Timetables For 2013
Commission Regulatory Actions (2013), http://www.fgc.ca.gov/regulations/2013/2013regulatory
calendarpdf. The Commission revises its regulations for mammals, including deer, in the meetings
between December and April. Id. Under state law, California's DFW must provide recommendations to
the Commission for revising deer hunting regulations by December 15. FISH & GAME § 457. Counties
have the ability to object to proposed deer hunting regulations, but must object by February 1. Id § 459.
126. Id. § 240.
127. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15252 (2015); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.5 (West 2015).
128. See Appendix C.
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within the state; those regulations are generally revised on a triennial basis.1 29
It also has special regulations for particular state waters, and those regulations
can be revised annually.130 For every cycle of revisions there are changes to
bag and possession limits (the total number of fish a fisher can catch and
possess in a given day) and season dates for various waterways.13 1
Likewise, the procedures for revision of federal waterfowl hunting
regulations are relatively simple and are regularly used, particularly with
respect to the numbers of waterfowl that can be taken.132 The FWS waterfowl
regulations are updated annually. The process begins with recommendations
provided by state and provincial fish and game officials and FWS officials,
beginning in January. 133 The FWS then proposes regulations for the upcoming
fall hunting season, takes public comment, and finalizes them by September.
The proposed and final regulations are published in the Federal Register;134
however, they are not codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.135 Different
regulations apply to different regions, with the most important regions being
the four "flyways": Pacific, Central, Mississippi, and Atlantic.13 6
129. For the current general trout regulations, see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 7.00. For an
overview of the process by which fishing regulations are revised, see CAL. FISH & GAME COMM'N, NEW
AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS-2013, http://www.fgc.ca.gov/regulations/2013/index.aspx (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015). For a year-by-year history of revisions to trout regulations, see the list of regulatory
revisions at CAL. FISH & GAME COMM'N, FISH AND GAME REGULATIONS, http://www.fgc.ca.gov/
regulations/2015/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
130. The Klamath River basin general regulations are also revised annually. See generally CAL.
FISH & GAME COMM'N, FISH AND GAME REGULATIONS, supra note 129 (showing that generally the
regulations are revised annually).
131. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME COMM'N, FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR REGULATORY
ACTION RE: SPORT FISHING BAG LIMITS (2009), http://www.fgc.ca.gov/regulations/2009/5O0fsor.pdf
(providing overview of the proposed revisions for 2009).
132. For a brief overview of the process, see Byron K. Williams & Fred A. Johnson, Adaptive
Management and the Regulation of Waterfowl Harvests, 23 WILDLIFE Soc'Y BULL. 430, 432 (1995);
James D. Nichols et al., Adaptive Harvest Management of North American Waterfowl Populations: A
Brief History and Future Prospects, 148 J. ORNITHOLOGY S343, S344-S345 (2007).
133. See Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Service Proposes Waterfowl Hunting Season
2015-2016 Frameworks, Streamlines Process for Setting Game Bird Hunting Seasons (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.fws.gov/news/ShowNews.cfm?ID=F3C2EF87-5056-AFOO-5B65A8B872D98718.
134. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Hunting; Proposed Frameworks for Early-Season Migratory Bird
Hunting Regulations; Notice of Meetings, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,920 (proposed July 20, 2012) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
135. Instead, the Code of Federal Regulations has the following placeholder language:
(a) [I]t is necessary to make annual adjustments in the schedules to limit the harvests of
migratory game birds to permissible levels.
(b) The development of these schedules involves annual data gathering programs to
determine migratory game bird population status and trends, evaluations of habitat
conditions, harvest information, and other factors having a bearing on the anticipated size of
the fall flights of these birds. The proposed hunting schedules are announced early in the
spring, and following consideration of additional information as it becomes available, as well
as public comment, they are modified and published as supplemental proposals.
Annual Seasons, Limits, and Shooting Hours Schedules, 50 C.F.R. § 20.100 (2015).
136. General Flyways Info, FLYWAYS.US, http://flyways.us/flyways/info (last visited Mar. 24,
2015). Each flyway is a distinct avian migration corridor. Id
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Environmental review is not undertaken for each individual revision of the
regulations; instead, the FWS conducts NEPA review for the entire adaptive
management framework of its overall hunting regulatory system.13 7
A few examples show how the FWS has used this regulatory framework to
make regular changes to waterfowl regulations. Blue-winged teal are a
representative waterfowl species that are monitored in order to assess harvest
potential for tcal generally.138 The population of blue-winged teal, like other
waterfowl populations, has fluctuated over the years due to environmental
factors, hunting regulations, and other management practices.139 In 2007 the
blue-winged teal population was estimated to be 6.7 million. 140 That year, the
FWS authorized a special September season for all species of teal in the
Atlantic flyway. The season was not to exceed nine consecutive days between
September I and September 30 with a daily bag limit of four teal.141 In 2008
the teal population was estimated to be 6.6 million birds, based on surveys of
blue-winged teal.142 The FWS again authorized a special September season
with the same parameters as in 2007.143 In 2009 the teal population was
estimated to be 7.4 million. 144 The FWS expanded the special September
season from nine to sixteen days whenever the breeding population of teal was
over 4.7 million.145 The extended season allowed an increased harvest without
overly depleting the population.14 6 In 2010 the estimated total population of
blue-winged teal was 6.3 million.147 The FWS maintained the sixteen-day
137. Issuance of Annual Regulations Permitting the Sport Hunting of Migratory Birds, 53 Fed.
Reg. 31,341, 31,341 (Aug. 18, 1988). The FWS is currently updating this EIS, but it continues to operate
under the 1988 EIS in the meantime. Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement on the
Issuance of Annual Regulations Permitting the Hunting of Migratory Birds, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,577, 39,577
(July 9, 2010).
138. TEAL HARVEST POTENTIAL WORKING GP., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HARVEST POTENTIAL
OF NORTH AMERICAN TEAL 4 (2013), http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/NewReportsPublications/
Teal/Final%20Teal%20Assessment%2OReport%2OMar%2012%202013.pdf.
139. See Adaptive Harvest Management, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/
migratorybirds/currentbirdissues/management/ahm/ahm-intro.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2015); see
generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ADAPTIVE HARVEST MANAGEMENT 2016 HUNTING SEASON
(2015).
140. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Early-Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 49,622, 49,623 (Aug. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
141. Id. at 49,627. A bag limit is the total number of birds a hunter can take in a given day.
142. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Early Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,678, 50,679 (Aug. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
143. Id
144. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Early-Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg. 43,008, 43,009 (Aug. 25, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
145. Id The proposal was based on analysis of the relationship between harvest data and
population estimates. Id.
146. See Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Early-Season Migratory Bird Hunting




special September season with a four-bird daily bag limit for the 2010
season.148
A second example is the regulation of scaup, another species of duck; they
are hunted in the late season from September to January.149 In 2007 data
showed that the continental scaup population had been declining for over
twenty years, and the total breeding population was estimated to be 3.45
million, the third lowest estimate on record.5 0 The FWS maintained the same
restrictive daily bag limits as in 2006: six ducks total, not more than two of
which are scaup in the Atlantic, Mississippi and Central Flyways and seven
ducks total, not more than three of which are scaup in the Pacific Flyway.151 In
2008 the estimated breeding population was 3.74 million, still well below the
long-term average. 152 Through population surveys and monitoring, the FWS
determined that the optimal harvest for the 2008-09 season was 200,000,
necessitating a change in regulations because 295,000 scaup were harvested
under the 2007 regulations.153 The FWS adopted a three-year trial of a
comprehensive regimen of restrictive, moderate, and liberal regulations, based
on population size, and imposed restrictive regulations for 2008.154 The
Atlantic and Mississippi Flyways allowed hunters to harvest six ducks per day,
two of which could be scaup for up to twenty consecutive days during the
season.155 For the remainder of the season, hunters could harvest up to six
ducks per day, only one of which could be scaup.'5 6 The Pacific Flyway
reduced its scaup limit to two of the seven ducks that could be harvested each
day during the season.157 The Central Flyway maintained a seventy-four-day
duck season with up to two scaup each day and either a five or six duck total
daily limit depending on the state.158
148. Id at 52,880.
149. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Framework for Late Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,882, 53,883 (Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20). The FWS
manages the two species of scaup, Greater Scaup (Aythya marila) and Lesser Scaup (A. affinis), as a
single population. SCAUP POPULATION ESTIMATES, FLYWAYS.US (June 29, 2010), http://flyways.us/
status-of-waterfowl/population-estimates/scaup-population-estimates. Duck season is 60 days long in
the Atlantic and Mississippi Flyways, 74 days long in the Central Flyway, and 107 days long in the
Pacific Flyway. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Framework for Late Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,890-91, 53,893.
150. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Framework for Late Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,885.
151. Id. at 53,890-91, 53,893.
152. Migratory Bird Hunting; Proposed Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,124, 51,125, 51,128 (Aug. 29, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
153. Id. at 51,128.
154. Id. at 51,128-29.
155. Id at 51,134-35.
156. Id
157. Id at 51,137; Migratory Bird Hunting; Proposed Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird
Hunting Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 50613, 50,626 (Aug. 31, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
158. Migratory Bird Hunting; Proposed Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 51,136.
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By 2009 the breeding population estimate for scaup had grown to 4.17
million. 159 Based on the increased population, the FWS loosened the hunting
regulations. In the Atlantic and Mississippi Flyways, for the entire season, up to
two of the six ducks harvested each day could be scaup.16 0 The Pacific Flyway
also increased harvest levels by shortening the hunting season for scaup, during
which time up to three of the seven-bird daily limit could be scaup.161 During
the remainder of the season there was a seven duck daily bag limit, but none
could be scaup.162 The Central Flyway allowed the take of six ducks per day,
no more than two of which are scaup.163 An estimated 229,000 scaup were
harvested in 2008-0916 and the population continued to grow to 4.24 million
in 2010.165
The FWS maintained the same harvest regulations in all flyways for 2010
and 2011. In 2011 the population was 4.32 million, 166 after 277,000 scaup were
harvested in 2009-10.167 The number of scaup harvested rose to 358,000 in
2010-11,168 and the scaup population reached 5.24 million in 2012.169 In 2012
the FWS allowed the harvest of more scaup in all of the flyways. In the Atlantic
and Mississippi Flyways, up to four of the six duck daily limit could be
scaup.170 In the Central Flyway, there was no restriction on scaup beyond the
six duck daily limit.1 7 1 In the Pacific Flyway there was no additional restriction
for season or bag limits, so hunters could harvest up to seven scaup per day for
the entire 107-day duck season.172
B. Hunting Regulations Generally Seen as Successful
in Accomplishing Goals
Wildlife managers generally perceive American hunting law at both the
state and federal level as having been extremely successful in restoring fish and
game populations to record highs in the late twentieth century, less than one
159. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird Hunting







165. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,250, 58,254 (Sept. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
166. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,682, 58,684 (Sept. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
167. 75 Fed. Reg. at 58,254.
168. 76 Fed. Reg. at 58,684.
169. Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,444, 58,447 (Sept. 20, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
170. Id at 58,446-47.
171. Id This policy allowed hunters to take scaup throughout the entire waterfowl hunting season,
not just during a limited period.
172. Id.
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hundred years after many fish and game species were extirpated from large
portions of the United States.1 73
In the late nineteenth century, the populations of many fish and game
species fell dramatically due to habitat destruction and overhunting.174 Many
migratory waterfowl species sharply declined as a result of hunting pressure
and conversion of wetlands habitat to human uses. Other migratory bird species
collapsed from being hunted for meat and feathers. Once common game
species such as beaver, turkeys, and deer disappeared from large portions of the
United States due to both habitat destruction and overharvesting.175 A
particularly extreme example of population collapse was the near-extinction of
buffalo from the Great Plains, whose populations once numbered in the tens of
millions;176 even more dramatic was the complete extinction of the passenger
pigeon, whose populations likely measured in the billions. Both species
disappeared in large part because of hunting pressure.177
These population collapses were a significant contributing factor to the
rise of the nascent conservation movement in the United States, which focused
on wisely managing natural resources for human use over the long run.178 A
173. See Valerius Geist, How Markets in Wildhfe Meat and Parts, and the Sale of Hunting
Privileges Jeopardizes Wildlife Conservation, 2 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 15, 17 (1988) (stating that
modem American wildlife law has produced a "recovery of wildlife [that] had been decimated over
most of the southern and central parts of the continent.... Today there are about 30 million big game
animals in the United States and Canada. .. Bison musk oxen, prong-homed bucks, and wood duck
returned from the verge of extinction; most big game species increased."); THOMAS R. DUNLAP, SAVING
AMERICA'S WILDLIFE 6-7 (1988) (describing collapse of wildlife populations in nineteenth-century
America).
174. See J.F. ORGAN ET AL., WILDLIFE SOC'Y, THE NORTH AMERICAN MODEL OF WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION 3 (2012), http://emwh.org/pdf/conservation/North%20American%2Model%20of%/`20
Wildlife%20Conservation.pdf; SPORTING CONSERVATION COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'TS OF INTERIOR &
AGRIC., STRENGTHENING AMERICA'S HUNTING HERITAGE AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES vii (2008) ("Two centuries of settlement and development
of our nation's lands and waters, unregulated market hunting, and a belief that wildlife was an
impediment to and an unlimited food source for civilization devastated wildlife populations and their
habitats across the continent."); S.P. Mahoney et al., The North American Model of Wildlfe
Conservation: Enduring Achievement and Legacy, in WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra at 7; lan McTaggart-Cowan, Man, Wildife, and Conservation in North America: Status and
Change, in WILDLIFE CONSERVATION POLICY: A READER 277, 294-96 (Valerius Geist & Ian
McTaggart-Cowan eds., 1995).
175. See, e.g., McTaggart-Cowan, supra note 174, at 296-97 (describing collapse of beaver
populations); Thomas R. McCabe & Richard E. McCabe, Recounting Whitetails Past, in THE SCIENCE
OF OVERABUNDANCE: DEER ECOLOGY AND POPULATION MANAGEMENT 11, 16-18 fig.2.2 (William J.
McShea et al. eds., 1997) (describing massive wave of hunting of white-tailed deer in the late nineteenth
century, and accompanying collapse in deer populations in North America); W. Matt Know, Historical
Changes in the Abundance and Distribution of Deer in Virginia, in THE SCIENCE OF OVERABUNDANCE:
DEER ECOLOGY AND POPULATION MANAGEMENT, supra at 27, 28 (similar pattern in Virginia).
176. See, e.g., McTaggart-Cowan, supra note 174, at 294-95 (describing collapse of bison).
177. THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAw 58-59 (1980).
178. See ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 3-4 (describing how the collapse of bird and mammal
populations in the United States led a prominent natural scientist, George Grinnell and President Teddy
Roosevelt to create the Boone and Crockett Club, which advocated for the creation and implementation
of fish and game laws); SPORTING CONSERVATION COUNCIL, supra note 174, at vii ("The unrestrained
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key goal for that movement was the development of state and federal wildlife
and hunting laws and policies that would curtail overhunting of fish and game
species and allow for the restoration of populations that were adequate for
recreational hunting.179
This movement would eventually form the basis for the creation of a new
profession and scientific discipline-wildlife management-that would have its
own journals, university departments, and professional societies.' Wildlife
managers would staff the new fish and game departments created at the state
and federal level to protect and restore fish and game populations throughout
the United States.'81
Conservationists and wildlife managers advocated for-and usually
succeeded in persuading state and federal agencies to (eventually) adopt-a
wide range of laws and policies to protect and restore fish and game
populations: the purchase and protection of important habitat, efforts to
reintroduce fish and game species to areas from which they had been
slaughter of the American bison and unsustainable forest, rangeland, and agricultural land practices in
the late 1800s motivated a clarion call from individuals like George Bird Grinnell, Gifford Pinchot,
Theodore Roosevelt, and others to take clear and decisive action. In response, the nation's hunters and
conservationists established new organizations dedicated solely to protect and conserve wildlife.");
Mahoney et al., supra note 174, at 7; JOHN F. REIGER, AMERICAN SPORTSMEN AND THE ORIGINS OF
CONSERVATION 94-104 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing that the collapse of passenger pigeon, buffalo, and
migratory bird populations as a result of hunting inspired the conservation movement); DALE D. GOBLE
& ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 771-73 (2d. ed. 2010) (quoting
KURKPATRICK DORSEY, THE DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY: U.S.-CANADIAN WILDLIFE
PROTECTION TREATIES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 12, 13-14 (1998)).
179. See ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 4, 15 (describing how the Boone and Crockett Club
pushed for the enactment of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Lacey Act, which prohibited
interstate commerce in game caught in violation of state law); id. at 15 ("The Boone and Crockett Club
was responsible for important legislation at the state and federal levels."); id. at 17 (State agencies
ensured that "[h]unting methods were regulated to conform to accepted standards of fair chase as
outlined by the Boone and Crockett Club, which would ideally minimize opportunities for hunters to
exceed bag limits."); SPORTING CONSERVATION COUNCIL, supra note 174, at vii ("This citizen-driven
conservation movement ultimately led to the development of treaties, conventions, laws, regulations,
and protections for wildlife and their habitat."); REIGER, supra note 178, ch. 6 (describing history of
Boone and Crockett Club, its goal of changing state and federal hunting laws, and its effectiveness in
making changes in the law), 152-53 (noting the tremendous power of the Club's membership, including
many of the leading American politicians and businessmen of the day); DUNLAP, supra note 173, at 11
("Sportsmen wanted to outlaw 'unsporting' methods that gave the game no chance.... They wanted to
reduce annual kills through lower bag limits, shorter seasons, and regulations on the kind of fireanns
hunters could use. They sought the abolition of spring hunting. They wanted all these new laws
enforced, preferably by a professional set of wardens under the direction of a state game commission.").
180. See Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How Scientific Disciplines Can Shape
Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 471, 495, 511 (2012); DUNLAP, supra note 173, at 76, 78
(describing the development of game management as a separate academic discipline from ecology,
noting that the Wildlife Society was founded in 1936, with the Journal of Wildlife Management first
published two years later in 1938); Thomas R. Dunlap, Organization and Wildlife Preservation: The
Case of the Whooping Crane in North America, 21 SOC. STUD. SCI. 197, 200-01 (1991); SAMUEL P.
HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1955-1985, at 19 (1987); ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 15.
181. See Biber, supra note 180, at 495, 511-12; DUNLAP, supra note 173, at 76, 78.
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eradicated, and education efforts to convince the public to support conservation
of wildlife resources.182 But for our purposes here, it is most important that
they also advocated for the development of government regulations controlling
the hunting of wildlife. 183
Those regulations imposed consistent, strict, and effectively enforced
regulation on the taking of most fish and game species for the first time in
American history.184 They effectively terminated the use of hunting game
species for most commercial purposes (such as feathers or meat).185 They were
dramatic changes from the prior legal status quo, under which hunting was seen
as a fundamental American right, and landowners could not even prosecute
hunters for trespassing on their lands.186 Indeed, the new regulations prompted
fierce political and judicial resistance.187
182. See ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 4-5 (noting how wildlife managers called for federal
laws to not only restrict hunting, but also provide funding for wildlife restoration and habitat acquisition,
protection, and management). There is a significant class aspect to the wildlife conservation movement
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the membership of these organizations was often
from the social elite, and the effect of their efforts was to restrict or eliminate hunting for subsistence or
commercial purposes (more often pursued by lower class hunters) in favor of recreational "sportsman"
hunting (more often pursued by upper class hunters). See FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 95, at 49-50
(noting how "[m]uch of this early game conservation work was undertaken by wealthy, often socially
elite sportsmen in eastern cities concerned about disappearing game"); DUNLAP, supra note 173, at 12
(making same point).
183. See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text; see also FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note
95, at 49-50 (describing how conservation organizations pursued political lobbying to increase
enforcement of, and enactment of stricter game laws, and sometimes even funded their own private
enforcement efforts); REIGER, supra note 178, ch. 6 (discussing role of Boone and Crockett Club in
pushing for hunting reforms); DUNLAP, supra note 173, at 12 (noting success of conservation movement
in changing laws).
184. See LUND, supra note 177, at 57-59 (describing the futility of many state hunting laws
established before the late nineteenth century). The most important change appears to have been the
imposition of hunting licenses with associated fees. This created revenue for the enforcement of state
laws, and also allowed the development of effective "bag limits" in which hunters could only take a
certain number of wildlife in a given season; neither of these had been present earlier, and rendered
earlier systems ineffectual. Id. at 62-67.
185. See id. at 63-64; Geist, supra note 173, at 16-17; ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 14-15.
Trapping of fur-bearing mammals for the commercial fur market was generally exempted from these
prohibitions.
186. See, e.g., McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (1818) (holding that hunters can enter
unenclosed land without permission of landowner); Broughton v. Singleton, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.)
338 (1820) (same); GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 178, at 137-38 (noting that some states allowed
hunters to enter unenclosed private land without permission); FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 95, at
44-49 ("The idea that governed early America was that citizens had free use of all unenclosed lands,
even when privately owned and without regard for the landowner's wishes," and noting that some early
state constitutions protected that right for hunters); GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 178, at 135-36
(describing resistance in early nineteenth-century America to hunting and game laws because of the
history of draconian British game laws that reserved game for the aristocracy, and a perception that the
ability to hunt without legal restriction was a fundamental American right), 136-37 (noting that early
American state constitutions protected a right to hunt).
187. See, e.g., GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 178, at 147-49 (discussing political and judicial
resistance to the enactment and enforcement of state hunting laws).
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Though consistent and strict, the regulations also incorporated flexibility.
The dominant ideology of the wildlife management profession emphasized
professional expertise in assessing the conservation needs of fish and game
species, and creating professional agencies that would be legally empowered to
change regulations as needed to meet those needs. 1 As a result, even early on
many state fish and game agencies had tremendous discretion to enact and alter
hunting regulations.189
This new model of wildlife management-what scholars have called the
North American Model of Wildlife Conservationi9 0-is generally seen as
having been extremely successful at accomplishing its goal: recovering and
restoring fish and game populations across the United States.19' Populations of
important game species such as deer, turkey, and beaver rebounded and were
reintroduced to most of the United States.19 2 While habitat protection and
188. For instance, the foundational textbook in the field was Aldo Leopold's Game Management.
Leopold argued that it was essential to separate the regulation and administration of hunting laws from
politics, and that a good game administration required large regulatory powers. ALDO LEOPOLD, GAME
MANAGEMENT 227, 407-08 (1933); see also REIGER, supra note 178, at 175-76 (noting calls by then-
New York Governor Teddy Roosevelt for the separation of politics from hunting regulation).
189. See, e.g., Reiger, supra note 178, at 175-76 (describing power of New York's Fish, Game,
and Forests Commission around the turn of the twentieth century); see also Migratory Bird Treaty Act
of 1918, 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (giving great discretion to the Fish & Wildlife Service, including the ability
"to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the
conventions to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment,
transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, and to adopt suitable
regulations permitting and governing the same").
190. See ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 1-2; see also DUNLAP, supra note 173, at 34 ("In the
decades around the turn of the century, Americans laid the institutional and intellectual foundations for a
wildlife policy.").
191. See Geist, supra note 173, at 15; ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174 ; Executive Summary, in
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 174; Valerius Geist et al., Why Hunting
Has Defined the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTY-
SIXTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE 2001, at 175, 175
(Jennifer Rahm & Richard McCabe eds., 2001) ("wildlife conservation was the greatest environmental
success story of the twentieth century"). The very success of the North American Model has raised new
problems. Overpopulation of deer populations, for instance, has created a range of conflicts (such as car
accidents and the increase in tick-borne diseases). The Model has also been criticized for its single-
minded focus on species that are desired for human recreational use in the form of hunting and fishing,
and for ignoring the impacts of wildlife management on "non-game" wildlife species. See Michael P.
Nelson, et al., An Inadequate Construct? North American Model: What's Flawed, What's Missing,
What's Missing, Wildlife Prof'1 58, 58-60 (Summer 2011). Indeed, it was this focus of wildlife
management on fish and game wildlife species that prompted the creation of the competing discipline
and profession of conservation biology, which is interested in the protection and restoration of the entire
range of biodiversity. See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 894-95 (1994).
192. See, e.g., Valerius Geist, Great Achievements, Great Expectations: Successes of North
American Wildhfe Management, in COMMERCIALIZATION AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT: DANCING
WITH THE DEVIL 47, 54 (Alex W.L. Hawley ed., 1993) (arguing that the North American Model has
fostered a tremendous rebound in game populations from near extinction in the late nineteenth century);
J.J. Jackson, Ill, An International Perspective on Trophy Hunting, in TOURIST HUNTING IN TANZANIA 1,
7 fig.1 (N. Leader-Williams et al. eds., 1996) (chart showing rebound of common game animals in
North America, such as deer, elk, turkey, antelope, and duck, from extremely low levels to levels that
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active reintroduction efforts were certainly part of this success,19 3 wildlife
management scholars have also credited state and federal hunting laws with
contributing to this successful outcome.194
Deer are perhaps the most important game animal in North America, and
their management history shows both the flexibility of hunting regulations over
time and their relative success in restoring and managing deer populations. In
Wisconsin, for instance, between 1908 and 1954 the season length and the
regulations on how many and what type of deer hunters could kill changed
twenty-eight times.195 In that time frame, deer populations in Wisconsin
rebounded from a low in the early twentieth century to over carrying capacity,
and then returned to more sustainable levels.196 At least some of the credit for
the increase, and the later ability to reduce population numbers, was given to
the flexible use of hunting regulations.197
More recently, at the federal level, the flexible federal waterfowl
regulatory system has been identified as one of the few examples of highly
successful adaptive management, resulting in significant increases in many
waterfowl populations.198
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Hunting and fishing law have traditionally had the same central objective:
to manage human use of wildlife in a way that results in maximization of
hunting and fishing opportunities over the long term.19 9 But the two areas of
are multiple orders of magnitude higher); see also C. Davison Ankney, An Embarrassment of Riches:
Too Many Geese, 60 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 217, 217-18 (1996) (noting that goose populations have
increased "exponentially during the past 30 years"); McCabe & McCabe, supra note 175, at 11, 16-18
fig.2.2 (describing rebound of deer populations in North America in the twentieth century); Know, supra
note 175, at 33-34 (similar pattern in Virginia).
193. See ORGAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 5 ("[Bly the 1920s it was clear that the system's
emphasis on restrictive game laws was insufficient in itself to stem wildlife's decline."); DUNLAP, supra
note 173, at 65-75 (noting mixed success of hunting laws by the 1930s and arguing that a key problem
was a lack of scientific understanding of the ecology of game species).
194. See, e.g., Geist, supra note 173; Ankney, supra note 192, at 217 (arguing that conservative
hunting regulations have "served us well in the 20th century as we have dug ourselves out of the hole
created by gross overharvests in the 19th century").
195. See BURTON L. DAHLBERG & RALPH C. GUETTINGER, THE WHITE-TAILED DEER IN
WISCONSIN 208-09 tbl.50 (1956). Additional changes continued after 1954, including the addition of
varying hunting rules within the state. See William A Creed et al., Harvest Management: The Wisconsin
Experience, in WHITE-TAILED DEER: ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 243,243-246 (Lowell K. Halls ed.,
1984). These changes were made by both the legislature and the relevant state commissions in charge of
regulating game hunting. See DAHLBERG & GUETTINGER, supra at 243 (describing system in 1980s that
is run through the state fish and game agency with review by the legislature), 243-45 app. A (providing
overview of history of Wisconsin hunting laws noting that some changes were made by legislature, and
that commissions in charge of hunting did not receive their full authority until 1933).
196. See DAHLBERG & GUETrINGER, supra note 195, at 26,28 figs.2, 33, 203 & 236.
197. See id. at 38 (stating that deer hunting law "was successful in building up deer populations").
198. See Nichols et al., supra note 132, at S346-S348.
199. There are other objectives in both fisheries and hunting law besides maximizing the potential
harvest of fish or game animals. In the context of fisheries, the Magnuson-Stevens Act seeks to advance
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law have produced very different results. Hunting law has been perceived over
time as highly successful.20 0 Fisheries law, on the other hand, has often
produced poor management outcomes-even measured by the most utilitarian,
human-centered perspective of maximizing stock productivity over the long
run.20 1 What explains the difference in outcomes?
A. Assessing the Reasons for Differing Outcomes
There are three factors that might explain the relative success of hunting
law. First, fish populations are far more difficult to study than wildlife
populations, resulting in greater uncertainty regarding population levels and
dynamics. Greater uncertainty translates to a greater likelihood of error in
management decisions. Second, the substantive standards in hunting law are
noticeably more flexible than those contained in the Magnuson-Stevens Act. In
theory, flexible standards allow managers to quickly adjust rules in response to
new information. Finally, the political economy of marine fisheries features
concentrated interests, that is, industry groups with incentives both to organize
and to push against more stringent regulation.
1. The Effects of Greater Scientific Uncertainty
There is no question that uncertainty for resource managers is higher in the
context of fisheries management han in wildlife management.2 02 Our ability to
assess what is occurring in the oceans-both for fish populations directly and
for their habitat-is much more limited than for, say, white-tailed deer.20 3
Scientific uncertainty gives resource managers more discretionary space within
which to operate. As uncertainty increases, managers will accrue a larger and
larger set of legally and politically defensible management options. Thus, at
least on this metric, fishery managers have more discretion than their wildlife
counterparts.
protection of marine ecosystems as well as economic efficiency in commercial fisheries. See, e.g.,
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(5) (2012)
(requiring fisheries management plans "where practicable" to "consider efficiency in the utilization of
fishery resources); id. § 1853(b)(2)(B) (allowing fisheries management plans to protect deep sea corals
from fishing damage); id § 1855(b) (requiring designation of essential fish habitat). Likewise, in the
context of the protection of terrestrial ecosystems and species, there has been a substantial shift away
from focusing simply on protection of species that are useful for recreational hunting and fishing, and a
move towards protecting ecosystems and species more broadly. See Biber, supra note 180, at 493-500,
511-12.
200. See supra notes 192-194.
201. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A HISTORY OF U.S.
MARINE FISHERIES POLICY 177 (2002); Timothy Hennessey & Michael Healey, Ludwig's Ratchet and
the Collapse ofNew England Groundfish Stocks, 28 COASTAL MGMT. 187, 199-205 (2000).
202. Marc Mangel, Irreducible Uncertainties, Sustainable Fisheries and Marine Reserves, 2
EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY RES. 547,547 (2000).
203. See generally COMM. ON FISH STOCK ASSESSMENT METHODS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
IMPROVING FISH STOCK ASSESSMENTS (1998), http://www.nap.edulcatalog/5951/improving-fish-stock-
assessments (available to read online or as free download).
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An example helps to illustrate the point. Imagine that there are two fish
stocks, one of which spends most of its time in rivers ("river fish"), while the
other is purely a marine animal ("marine fish"). Because it is easier to assess
the river species, river fish scientists can say that there is a 95 percent
probability that the optimal population, that is, the population capable of
producing MSY, is between 40 and 50 percent of the prefishing population
level. Due to the scale of the marine environment, and the difficulty of working
there, marine fish scientists have a much more difficult time measuring and
understanding the reproductive behavior of marine fish. As a result, they can
only say, with 95 percent confidence, that the optimal population of marine fish
is between 10 and 90 percent of the prefishing level. This example illustrates
how uncertainty creates flexibility: marine fish managers could more easily
defend MSY choices of 20 or 80 percent than could the river-fish managers.
The example also illustrates how greater uncertainty reduces the
likelihood of successful management by increasing the potential distance
between each management decision and what would have been the correct
decision in that instance. This feature of uncertainty likely explains some of the
difference in results obtained through hunting and fishing laws.
The greater uncertainty in fisheries management has a range of
implications for decision making: It makes it more difficult to assess the status
or trends of fish species or populations; it makes it more difficult to identify
causal relationships between management choices and those status or trends;
and it makes it more difficult to assess management-which makes improving
management hat much harder. Accordingly, we might expect that fisheries, as
the area with greater uncertainty, have worse management outcomes.
The environmental law literature has argued that appropriate flexibility is
needed to respond to uncertainty. Thus to respond to the risks outlined above,
we need to give management and regulatory agencies the ability to change
positions quickly as we gain additional information. In other words, we need
more flexibility to respond to uncertainty by experimenting in management, so
that we can pursue adaptive management in order to both acquire additional
information as well as change in response to those improvements in
information.
Yet the discretion that uncertainty gives to a management or regulatory
agency is a form of flexibility, albeit different from that identified as a positive
feature of environmental law that can adapt to climate change. And our history
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act makes clear that it was the reduction of
flexibility that appears to have produced improved outcomes in the context of
fisheries management.204 That indicates that the relationship between
uncertainty and flexibility may not be so direct.
204. This conclusion is consistent with previous observations about the important role that
inflexibility can play in environmental law. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1316 (2009); Doremus, supra note 34 at 51-59; Oliver Houck, Tales from a
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2. The Effects of Flexible Standards
Under most hunting laws, managers are permitted to set annual harvest
limits on an almost unlimited basis.205 From 1976 to 1996, the same could be
said of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Admittedly the Act was nominally more
stringent than hunting laws insofar as it required the councils to strive for a
particular goal (optimum yield as derived from MSY). Yet as noted above, this
constraint was often honored in the breach-hence Congress significantly
tightening the reins in 1996 and 2006.
Throughout the period prior to 1996, when both hunting laws and the
Magnuson-Stevens Act featured a great degree of substantive flexibility, the
two legal regimes produced starkly different results. It was only after Congress
reduced the amount of substantive flexibility in fisheries law that the statistics
on overfishing and overfished stocks began to improve. Decreased flexibility
meant better, though still not ideal, outcomes.
One could argue that the Magnuson-Stevens Act provided the wrong kind
of flexibility compared to hunting law. Fisheries management still relies on the
MSY concept as the basis for the optimum yield standard that is supposed to
guide management council decisions. The MSY concept has been sharply
criticized as being ineffective, based on out-of-date ecological conceptions, and
impossible to implement given informational limits.20 6 Hunting law, in
contrast, has no comparable guiding standard.
Is this reliance on a problematic standard at the heart of the failures of
fisheries management? An MSY-based standard might lead to overexploitation
of a resource because it is an engineering-like approach, the goal of which is to
fish up to the edge of what is sustainable, rather than to leave room for error.
Given the uncertainty in fisheries science, this exercise is as challenging as
"balancing a marble on top of a dome."207 It should thus be no surprise that
fisheries managers often fail to achieve the Magnuson-Stevens Act's goal of
sustainable fisheries.
Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCIENCE 1926, 1928 (2003). Along
the same lines, the precautionary principle, one of the most important environmental policy concepts of
the past thirty years, can be viewed as a call for greater inflexibility: it commands action, limits the
option of inaction, and thus constrains decision makers. For a complete discussion of the precautionary
principle, its history, and its meaning, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
205. For an extreme example, see the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2012) (The
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to "determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what
means ... to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation,
carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations
permitting and governing the same, in accordance with such determinations.").
206. Punt & Smith, supra note 73, at 46; see also Joan Roughgarden & Fraser Smith, Why
Fisheries Collapse and What to Do About It, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sel. 5078, 5078 (1996); see supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
207. Roughgarden & Smith, supra note 206, at 5078.
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But if the problem is a standard that allows for managers to exploit a
resource up to the edge of sustainability, the situation in hunting law is even
worse than in fisheries law. Hunting laws place almost no constraint on
agencies in terms of the level of hunting pressure that is permitted.
Nonetheless, they have had much greater success over time than fisheries laws.
3. The Interaction ofPolitical Economy and Flexibility
A third possible explanation for the difference in outcomes between
hunting and fisheries law is the different political context for the two resource
management problems. Economic forces drive the commercial and recreational
exploitation of fisheries, with billions of dollars in revenue and billions of
dollars of capital investments such as fishing boats and processing facilities.208
Tens of thousands of Americans are directly employed in fishing; jobs in many
coastal communities depend on the vitality of the fishing industry.209 And the
commercial fishing industry is composed of a wide range of economic actors,
including large, integrated, multinational corporations.
The fishing industry-particularly the commercial fishing industry-has a
direct, short-term incentive to maximize the take of fish from the ocean. It
therefore has a strong incentive to push regulators to authorize higher levels of
legal fishing. Of course, high levels of legal fishing create a range of risks: for
instance, the risk to the long-term sustainability of the commercial fishery, and
the risk of harm to other marine resources.210 Society has a strong interest in
providing for long-term sustainable fisheries, as well as in protecting other
marine resources. However, those interests are shared by society as a whole,
while the benefits of short-term maximization of fishing activity are
concentrated within the commercial fishing industry.2 11 This creates a classic
public choice problem. Interest groups that have fewer members who will
receive higher per capita gains from a regulatory decision (here, commercial
fishers), have a significant organizational advantage over the interest groups
208. According to NOAA, "U.S. commercial and recreational saltwater fishing generated more
than $199 billion in sales and supported 1.7 million jobs in 2012." NOAA REPORT, supra note 92, at 1.
209. Id
210. In addition to impacts on target species and their food webs, fishing can harm marine
ecosystems in two other important ways. First, the use of some kinds of fishing gear can lead to
temporary or permanent damage to ocean habitats; this, in tum, can harm the species dependent on those
habitats. Douglas J. McCauley et al., Marine Defaunation: Animal Loss in the Global Ocean, 347
SCIENCE 1,255,641, 1,255,641-44 (2015). Second, fishing gear often kills nontargeted animals, such as
endangered turtles, in a phenomenon known as "by-catch." See, e.g., Rebecca L. Lewison et al., Global
Patterns of Marine Mammal, Seabird, and Sea Turtle Bycatch Reveal Taxa-Specific and Cumulative
Megafauna Hotspots, Ill PROC. NATL ACAD. SCL 5271, 5271 (2014); Shelby Oliver et al., Global
Patterns in the Bycatch ofSharks and Rays, 54 MARINE POL'Y 86, 86 (2015).
211. Of course, commercial fishers should have an interest in the long-term sustainability of fish
stocks. However, people may focus too much on the short term in making decisions. Cass R. Sunstein,
Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 239 (1993).
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that have lower per capita gains from a regulatory decision and that have more
members (here, the broader public).212
The high levels of uncertainty in fisheries science interact with this public
choice dynamic in important ways. Uncertainty means a wide range of catch
choices are scientifically justifiable. And industry, naturally, would prefer a
catch allotment near the top of that range and pressures the councils
accordingly. Yet because a choice higher in the recommended range has a
greater chance of leading to overfishing than a lower one, a consistent pattern
of higher choices enhances the risks of overfishing and long-term unsustainable
fisheries. Indeed, in this context the failure of MSY management standards in
the fisheries context makes sense, because the interaction of interest group
pressures and uncertainty would consistently result in setting catch levels at or
above MSY, increasing the risk of overfishing.
Congress has attempted to defuse this dynamic. In the 2006 amendments
to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Congress gave each council's Scientific and
Statistical Committee responsibility for choosing an annual catch level from the
range of uncertain options.2 13 It had good reason. A study conducted prior to
this change, when the councils set the annual catch level, showed that some
councils regularly selected annual catch levels that were at or above the high
end of the range recommended by scientists.2 14 This is either a predictable
response to the political dynamic described above, a logical outcome of
industry-dominated councils, or a combination of the two. It is not clear that the
2006 changes will completely eliminate the problem by giving decision-making
authority to the Scientific and Statistical Committees. There is some data
suggesting that council scientists are not immune to the pressure for higher
quotas.2 15
Hunting law has a very different political backdrop. There is almost no
commercial hunting industry in the United States today.2 16 Most contemporary
hunting is either recreational or subsistence-based. That is no accident. One of
the first reforms states implemented in the late nineteenth century was
prohibiting commercial hunting of animals.2 17 Those regulations-combined
with federal enforcement of state laws by restricting interstate transport of
wildlife taken in violation of state law-effectively eliminated what had been a
very large industry.1 '8
212. This advantage will be particularly strong when some of the interests at issue are public
goods, for instance the existence or option value of the protection of marine diversity.
213. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(6)
(2012).
214. Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry's Question: Dissecting
Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OcEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649, 659-60 (2003).
215. Id.
216. The exception is a limited amount of commercial trapping of fur-bearing mammals.
217. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
218. The federal Lacey Act prohibits interstate transportation of wildlife taken in violation of state
law. See 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1).
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Thus, in the context of hunting, there is no large, powerful, concentrated
interest group with a stake in increasing the levels of take for animals. Of
course, there are a lot of hunters and recreational fishers in the United States,
and they do buy a lot of gear; there is, accordingly, a large industry that makes
and sells recreational hunting and fishing equipment. But that industry simply
has a stake in the continued existence of legal hunting. Whether the bag limit
for deer in a season is one, two, or three does not have a major impact on the
purchase of items such as rifles, binoculars, or clothing. Indeed, the recreational
hunting and fishing industry has a stake in ensuring high population levels for
game animals in order to make recreational hunting as appealing as possible.
For hunting laws, there is no powerful interest group that has an incentive
to use the flexibility of the legal structure to push for higher exploitation of the
resource. That leads to the possibility that the political context determines
whether flexibility can be more successful in managing the uncertainties of
resource management.
B. How to Ensure Flexibility Will Do More Good than Harm
Our two case studies highlight the need to understand the political,
ecological, and economic context of a management and regulatory system to
grasp when and how flexibility will produce better outcomes. Arguments for a
broader use of flexibility in environmental law must take that context into
account if we are to achieve better outcomes.
The most basic lesson from our case studies is that we should be more
skeptical about flexibility, or be more careful about how flexibility is used,
when faced with powerful interest groups that can capture the regulatory or
management system-just as the fishing industry has historically dominated
fisheries decision making. This does not mean that we should not have
flexibility in these legal systems, but rather that we should structure that
flexibility in ways that reduce the influence or ability of dominant interest
groups to control outcomes.
In fact, various elements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, particularly the
amendments made in 1996 and 2006, can be seen as ways to balance between
the need for flexibility to respond to changed circumstances and prevent the
manipulation of outcomes by powerful interest groups. That balance was struck
in two major ways.
First, the 1996 amendments that altered the definition of optimum yield
and created mandatory time limits for rebuilding overfished stocks clearly
limited the councils' discretion. In doing so, the Act created clear markers that
guided decision making-markers that could be enforced both within the
agency (e.g., NOAA review of council decisions) and, perhaps more
importantly, by outside parties through judicial review. It is still very, very hard
for plaintiffs to successfully challenge a fishery management plan or
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regulations-but clear standards should make it easier to prove agency
noncompliance.
This method of constraining flexibility is important because it identifies
the ways in which interest groups are most likely to alter agency decision
making-by pushing for overfishing-and it creates a hard, enforceable barrier
to restrict the impact of that pressure. Both clarity and enforceability are
important here, because they each reinforce the other. The clear mandates make
it more likely courts will enforce the restrictions, and external enforcement is
essential to ensure that the mandates are actually complied with in decision
making.
The second category includes the Magnuson-Stevens Act's various efforts
to require the use of up-to-date scientific information in decision making. The
second of ten "National Standards for Fishery Management"-enacted in the
original version of the Act-requires that decision makers acquire and use the
"best scientific information available."2 19 It can be inferred from Congress'
inclusion of the adjectives "best" and "available" that it intended for managers
to gather and input scientific information on a continuing basis.
Other provisions reinforce this conclusion. With respect to the gathering
of information, the statute mandates that managers "develop . . . multi-year
research priorities for fisheries, fisheries interactions, habitats, and other areas
of research that are necessary for management purposes," and that these
research priorities "be updated as necessary."22 0 Congress added this provision
in 2006. It is clear that Congress intended for managers to consider research
findings and, if needed, incorporate those findings into fisheries regulation: the
Act requires that decision makers "review on a continuing basis, and revise as
appropriate," estimates of each fishery's optimum yield and issue management
measures consistent with those estimates.22 1 To ensure that managers make
appropriate revisions, another 2006 addition to the Act requires that fishery
management plans include accountability measures, that is, rules meant to force
managers to penalize themselves for decisions that lead to excessive fishing.222
The technical nature of this information could hinder efforts to incorporate
it into management measures. Put differently, the use of decision makers
unfamiliar with the terms and concepts of fisheries science and management
would interpose substantial transaction costs between information and action.
In the original version of the Act, Congress sought to reduce these costs by
requiring that appointed council members be "knowledgeable regarding the
conservation and management, or the commercial or recreational harvest, of the
fishery resources of the geographical area concerned."2 23 The 2006
219. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2).
220. Id. § 1852(h)(7).
221. Id. § 1852(h)(5).
222. Id. § 1853(a)(15).
223. Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A). Over time, appointed members have been more likely to be familiar with
"harvest" than "conservation and management." See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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amendments added a requirement that each member of the public appointed to
a council after 2006 take a training course that, among other things, provides
council members with education on fisheries science and management.224
To further ensure that incoming science is more readily available to the
decision-making process, from the beginning the Act has mandated that each
regional fishery management council establish a "scientific and statistical
committee."225 Each committee is responsible for helping to translate science
into management, by "provid[ing] its Council ongoing scientific advice for
fishery management decisions."226 With respect to the most important
operative rule in any fishery-annual limits on total catch-the 2006
amendments significantly limited council discretion (flexibility): the Act now
prohibits a council from setting an annual limit for a fishery that exceeds the
limit recommended by that council's Scientific and Statistical Committee.227
If uncertainty facilitates the use of political pressure by powerful interest
groups to skew agency decision making-as we discussed above-then these
provisions make a lot of sense. They directly require the agency to use up-to-
date science in ways that should help to reduce uncertainty over time. Even
more importantly, they set up institutional structures that can increase the
likelihood that the up-to-date science will be used, rather than ignored.
Of course, science is not a cure all for uncertainty. There will be inevitable
residual uncertainty given the difficulties of managing fisheries. And updating
the science may at times increase uncertainty.
But the key here is the interaction of uncertainty with powerful interest
groups, and the importance of maintaining integrity in decision making by
basing the process on science.2 28 The most egregious problems that arise from
the interaction of uncertainty with powerful interest groups occur when interest
groups use the uncertainty to mask policy choices-for instance, to claim that a
fishing quota is conservative when in fact it is insufficiently stringent and
increases long-term risk to the health of the fishery. A blatant example of this
kind of manipulation is the retroactive revision by fisheries management
councils of the scientific estimates of what would be sustainable fishing
levels.229 This kind of tampering reduces transparency for regulatory and
management decision making and accordingly accountability for decision
224. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(k)(1).
225. Id. § 1852(g)(1)(A).
226. Id § 1852(g)(1)(B).
227. Id. § 1852(h)(6). In the alternative, a council can opt to use a peer-review process to generate
recommendations on annual catch limits. Id § 1852(g)(1)(E). For examples of how the councils, prior to
2006, sometimes ignored scientific advice, see Eagle & Thompson, supra note 214, at 655.
228. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 Texas L.
Rev. 1601, 1601-02 (2008).
229. See supra Part ll.B.2 (discussing the manipulation of data by fisheries management councils).
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makers and interest groups.230 External bodies like Scientific and Statistical
Committees make it harder for this kind of manipulation to occur.
Both direct mandates to use science in decision making and agency
structures that ensure science is used transparently and effectively reduce the
flexibility of agencies. They both constrain the substance of outcomes and add
complexity to the procedures that must be followed. But again, if uncertainty
accentuates the influence of powerful interest groups over regulatory or
management decisions, then these kinds of constraints may be essential where
both uncertainty and powerful interest groups exist.
Such coexistence is common-powerful interest groups and uncertainty
are both endemic to environmental law. So it seems likely to us that the two
elements of restraint on flexibility present in the Magnuson-Stevens Act will be
important elements for a wide range of environmental laws-regardless of
flexibility's importance. And also note that neither of these elements-clear
and enforceable substantive constraints on certain management or regulatory
outcomes, and mandates to use the best science-necessarily have to seriously
reduce the virtues of flexibility. The fishery management councils in the
Magnuson-Stevens Act continue to regularly update fishing regulations, for
instance.
CONCLUSION
There are surely other lessons to draw from other case studies about when
and how flexibility is beneficial for environmental law. There will be other
economic, political, social, and ecological factors that will counsel in favor of,
or against, flexibility. In turn, those factors will suggest specific legal or
institutional design features to reduce the risks of flexibility and increase its
benefits. We do not believe that our brief survey of these two case studies has
fully answered all of these questions. But if we are to dive into a brave new
world of increased flexibility in environmental law in order to facilitate climate
change adaptation, it is essential that we start asking and answering these
questions.
These questions will come up repeatedly-because political pressure on
management and regulatory programs will not go away. In May of 2014,
Congressman Hastings of Washington introduced a bill entitled the
"Strengthening Fisheries Communities and Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries
Management Act," intended to give the councils the same levels of discretion
they enjoyed prior to the 1996 and 2006 amendments.2 31
230. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1614-17 (1995).
231. See Press Release, House Comm. On Nat. Res., Chairman Hastings Seeks Public Input on
Draft Plan to Strengthen and Improve our Nation's Fisheries Unveils Draft Proposal to Reauthorize the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Dec. 19, 2013), http://natural
resources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentD-364840; Sean Cosgrove, Rep. Hastings'
Empty Oceans Act Is a Surefire Disaster for New England's Ocean, Fisheries and Communities,
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We also think that answering and asking these questions will usually have
to be done with a fairly high degree of specificity-at least until we can get a
more general theory of how flexibility does and does not work in
environmental law.
The case of recreational fisheries and "marine reserves"-areas of the sea
that bar fishing-makes clear why specificity in this kind of analysis is so
important. One general lesson we might take from our case studies is that if we
were to somehow (improbably, and probably undesirably) ban all commercial
fishing, just as commercial hunting was banned, our fishing regulatory system
would somehow operate much better. In other words, if we eliminated the
political pressure that stems from the existence of a large commercial fishing
industry, the major challenges in our regulatory system would disappear.
That hypothetical might or might not hold true for commercial fisheries.
But it would not hold true for recreational fisheries. Recreational fisheries are
often in worse shape than their commercial counterparts, with heavier fishing
pressures on populations that are at greater risk.2 32 Recreational fishing
organizations often have significant political weight.233 Due to the number of
vessels involved, monitoring and enforcement of fishing rules is also much
more difficult in recreational fishing than in commercial fishing.
One solution to the challenges that recreational fishing poses to the
sustainability of fisheries is to create more marine reserves. A wide range of
marine ecologists, fisheries scientists, and fisheries managers endorse the
concept of marine reserves.234 They are seen as a useful tool for a variety of
reasons: they are perhaps more resistant to the constant pressure of commercial
fishing interests to increase quota levels; a total ban on fishing can be easier to
enforce than quotas; they can protect a wide range of species and habitats that
might otherwise not be protected under species-specific provisions; and they
protect against the harm of fishing, regardless of its source (commercial or
recreational fishing).23 5




232. Felicia C. Coleman, et al., The Impact of United States Recreational Fisheries on Marine Fish
Populations, 305 SCIENCE 1958, 1958 (2004).
233. Suzanna Smith & Michael Jepson, Big Fish, Little Fish: Politics and Power in the Regulation
of Florida's Marine Resources, 40 SoC. PROBS. 39, 40, 47 (1993.
234. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS, SCIENTIFIC
CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON MARINE RESERVES AND MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (2001).
235. See Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational
Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427, 429-32 (2004). See also Jane Lubehenco et al., Plugging a
Hole in the Ocean: The Emerging Science of Marine Reserves, 13 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS S-3
(2003).
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While there has been some halting implementation of marine reserves,
they have run into a firestorm of political controversy.236 Often the most
significant opponents are recreational fishing groups. Note how in this context,
the politics are quite different from the story we have told about catch quotas
and commercial fishing interests. For commercial fishing interests, the key is to
have higher catch quotas; they may well be willing to accept having certain
areas of the ocean off limits, as long as they can take the same amount of fish
out of the ocean overall.
But for recreational fishing groups, particular places in the ocean may be
valued as a place to enjoy fishing activities, regardless of how many fish can be
caught. Marine reserves are a much more threatening regulation to recreational
fishers than catch quotas; they are also much more threatening to the interest
groups aligned with recreational fishers, such as the manufacturers of fishing
equipment.
Thus, if we really want to use marine reserves as a regulatory tool, we will
have to consider how to make that regulatory system appropriately flexible to
allow for changes in reserve design, extent, and regulatory framework while
making reserves resistant to the constant pressures from recreational fishing
groups to open areas of the ocean up to fishing. That might require a very
different regulatory structure, predicated on pressures from a very different
political context-even as compared to the apparently closely aligned problem
of catch quotas for commercial fishers.
The case studies also lay the groundwork for a discussion about what
"flexibility" actually means. The vocabulary of flexibility is stunted. There are
no words to describe relative degrees of flexibility or to describe it in absolute
terms. Along the same lines, flexibility derives from several different sources.
Congress may intentionally give agencies space within which they can lawfully
act; scientific uncertainty also creates space by making it possible for agencies
to defend a wide range of decisions. We have no terminology to source
flexibility, or adjectives for describing kinds of flexibility as beneficial or not.
It will always be the case that some kinds of flexibility, such as the flexibility to
readjust management choice in light of new information, are good, and other
kinds, such as the flexibility to implement flawed policy, are bad. Other kinds
of flexibility-such as procedural streamlining or shortcuts-may be beneficial
sometimes and not others.
The precautionary principle provides an example of shortcomings in our
vocabulary. A common statement of the principle can be found in the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development: "Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent environmental
236. See Josh Eagle, The Practical Effects of Delegation: Agencies and the Zoning of Public Lands
and Seas, 55 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 883-88 (2008).
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degradation."23 7 Is this a call for greater flexibility because it encourages
decision makers to make decisions, even where information is lacking, instead
of rigidly sticking to the status quo? Or, is the precautionary principle a call for
greater inflexibility because it asks decision makers to eliminate the option of
inaction, even where information is lacking?
As used in academic literature, the term "flexibility" is almost always
synonymous with "freedom," more specifically, with administrative freedom to
act.238 Freedom to act is more than just agency discretion, which describes a
space within which agencies are legally free to make, or not to make,
substantive decisions. Particularly in the climate change literature, flexibility
includes not only the concept of greater agency discretion, but also the idea that
administrative and judicial processes limit agencies' freedom to act.
Administrative freedom to act, in its purest forn, cannot possibly be what
scholars have in mind. Simply increasing agency discretion would allow
agencies to do both more desirable things and more undesirable things.
Reducing public and judicial scrutiny of rulemaking would allow agencies to
act more quickly but also in illogical and nontransparent manners.
Can we clarify the intended goals of enhanced flexibility and develop a
vocabulary consistent with those goals? One objective in the literature is to free
agencies from the impossible task of attempting to restore resources to
historical conditions. Provisions meant to do this might more accurately be
called "dynamic baseline" measures than flexibility measures. Similarly,
provisions for greater agency freedom to collect and act on new information
might be better described as "responsiveness" than "flexibility": the goal is not
freedom, but awareness and action.
These are questions we can only begin to answer with this article.
However, understanding what we mean by flexibility, and refining our
definitions of the term (or the various elements that might make up the concept)
is also essential if we are to rely on increased flexibility as a tool to address the
impacts of climate change on natural resources and the environment.
237. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l (Vol. 1), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
238. See supra Part 1. The Call for Flexibilityl.
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APPENDIX A
Year Allowable Biological Catch Total Annual Catch




























239. In some years, namely 1992 to 1995, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
officially modified scientists' advice on the range of allowable biological catch, increasing the upper of
the "safe" range. For the original scientific recommendations for those years, see Eagle & Thompson,
supra note 214 at 657; see also GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FRAMEWORK SEASONAL
ADJUSTMENT OF HARVEST LEVELS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
COASTAL MIGRATORY PELAGICS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO: INCLUDES ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT





No. of stocks subject to No. of overfished stocks
overfishing
Year (a erntag (as a percentage of known
(as a percentage of known stocks)
stocks)
1997 -- 96 (34%)
1998 -- 100 (33%)
1999 -- 103 (45%)
2000 72 (26%) 92 (38%)
2001 65 (22%) 81 (33%)
2002 66 (24%) 86 (36%)
2003 60 (21%) 76 (36%)
2004 44 (18%) 56 (28%)
2005 45 (19%) 54 (26%)
2006 48 (20%) 47 (25%)
2007 41 (17%) 45 (24%)
2008 41 (16%) 46 (23%)
2009 38 (15%) 46 (23%)
2010 40(16%) 48(23%)
2011 36(14%) 45(21%)
2012 29 (10%) 41 (19%)
2013 28(9%) 40(17%)
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APPENDIX C: RECENT CHANGES TO CALIFORNIA
DEER HUNTING TAG QUOTAS 2 4 0
837
Hunting 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Zone
Maximum number of tags issued
A 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000
B 55,500 55,500 55,500 35,000 35,000 35,000
C 8575 8150 8150 8150 8150 8150
D 3-5 33,000 33,000 33,000 33,000 33,000 33,000
D-6 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
D-7 9000 9000 9000 9000 9000 9000
D-8 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000
D-9 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
D-10 700 700 700 700 700 700
D-11 5500 5500 5500 5500 5500 5500
D-12 950 950 950 950 950 950
D-13 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000
D-14 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
D-15 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
D-16 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 13,000
D-17 500 500 500 500 500 500
D-19 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
X-1 2280 2370 1275 1275 1150 935
X-2 180 185 190 180 175 180
X-3a 250 240 230 280 310 295
X-3b 845 825 875 935 935 835
X-4 425 275 355 355 385 395
X-5a 60 60 65 60 65 75
X-5b 85 110 110 140 140 55
X-6a 325 325 325 325 325 320
X-6b 275 370 370 315 315 310
X-7a 205 200 200 230 230 220
X-7b 125 120 120 140 140 130
X-8 230 220 220 240 240 220
X-9a 775 650 650 650 650 650
X-9b 325 325 325 325 325 325
X-9c 325 325 325 325 325 325
X-10 400 400 400 400 400 400
240. All data compiled from California DFW regulations. See Fishing and Hunting Regulations,
CAL. DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Regulations (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
"Number of tags" refers to the number of deer tags issued in each hunting zone; each tag authorizes the
take of one deer by a hunter. For maps of the hunting zones, see California Deer Zone Map, Cal. Dep't
of Fish & Wildlife, http://www.dfg.ca.gov/wildlife/hunting/deer/cazonemap.htmi (last visited Mar. 24,
2015). "A" hunting zones are for archery hunts. Some of the hunting zones are on military bases, and
tags in those zones are divided between the general public and military personnel. Special thanks to
Mary Loum for compiling this table.
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Hunting 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Zone
X-12 850 760 760 860 860 680
G-1 2850 2170 2170 2170 2170 2710
G-3 35 35 35 35 35 35
G-6 50 50 50 50 50 50
G-7 20 20 20 20 20 20
1 Military Military Military Military Military Military
G-8 10 10 10 10 10 10
Military Military Military Military Military Military
10 10 10 10 10 10
Public Public Public Public Public Public
G-9 15 15 15 15 0 0
Military Military Military Military
15 15 15 15
Public Public Public Public
G-10 400 400 400 400 400 400
Military Military Military Military Military Military
G-11 500 500 500 500 500 500
Military/ Military/ Military/ Military/ Military/ Military/
DOD DOD DOD DOD DOD DOD
G-12 30 30 30 30 30 30
G-13 300 300 300 300 300 300
G-19 35 35 35 35 35 25
G-21 35 35 35 35 35 25
G-37 25 25 25 25 25 25
G-38 300 300 300 300 300 300
G-39 5 5 5 5 5 5
M-3 20 20 20 20 20 20
M-4 10 10 10 5 10 10
M-5 10 10 10 5 5 5
M-6 80 80 80 80 80 80
M-7 150 150 150 150 150 150
M-8 20 20 20 20 20 20
M-9 15 15 15 10 10 15
M-11 20 20 20 20 20 20
MA-1 150 150 150 150 150 150
MA-3 150 150 150 150 150 150
J-1 25 25 25 25 25 25
J-3 15 15 15 15 15 15
1-4 15 15 15 15 15 15
J-7 15 15 15 15 15 15
J-8 15 15 15 15 15 15
J-9 5 5 5 5 5 5
1-10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Military Military Military Military Military Military
75 75 75 75 75 75
Public Public Public Public Public Public
1-11 40 40 40 40 40 40
J-12 10 10 10 10 10 10
1-13 40 40 40 40 40 40
1-14 30 30 30 30 30 30
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Hunting 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Zone
J-15 10 10 10 10 10 10
J-16 75 75 75 75 75 75
J-17 25 25 25 25 25 25
J-18 75 75 75 75 75 75
J-19 25 25 25 25 25 25
1-20 20 20 20 20 20 20
1-21 50 50 50 50 50 50
Archery
Hunts
A-1 (C 2045 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945
Zones)
A-3 255 270 130 130 125 135
(Zone
X-1)
A-4 15 10 10 20 15 10
(Zone
X-2)
A-5 35 25 30 35 40 25
(Zone
X-3a)
A-6 95 80 90 90 90 90
(Zone
X-3b)
A-7 135 140 115 135 140 110
(Zone
X-4)
A-8 25 20 15 15 10 15
(Zone
X-5a)
A-9 10 5 5 5 5 5
(Zone
X-5b)
A-11 55 55 55 55 55 50
(Zone
X-6a)
A-12 140 140 140 110 110 100
(Zone
X-6b)
A-13 60 50 50 50 50 45
(Zone
X-7a)
A-14 20 25 25 25 25 25
(Zone
X-7b)
A-15 55 40 40 50 50 40
(Zone
X-8)
A-16 150 140 140 140 140 140
(Zone
X-9a)
A-17 300 300 300 300 300 300
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A-18 350 350 350 350 350 350
(Zone
X-9c)
A-19 120 120 120 120 120 100
(Zone
X-10)
A-20 200 170 170 190 190 100
(Zone
X-12) 20 10719100
A-21 25 25 25 25 25 25
A-22 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
A-24 100 100 100 100 100 100
A-25 35 35 35 35 35 35
A-26 30 30 30 30 30 30
A-27 10 10 10 5 5 5
A-30 40 40 40 40 40 40
A-31 1000 100 100 100 100 1000
A-32 250 250 250 250 250 250
A-33 25 25 25 25 25 25
Military Military Military Military Military Military
25 25 25 25 25 25
Public Public Public Public Public Public
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response
for our online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact
cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website,
http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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